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I. Executive Summary 
 and Recommendations
The term “ethnic profiling” describes the use by law enforcement officers of race, ethnic-
ity, religion, or national origin rather than individual behavior as the basis for making 
decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity. Ethnic profiling 
appears most frequently in police officers’decisions about who to stop and ask for iden-
tity papers (ID), question, search, and sometimes arrest. Although ethnic profiling is 
widespread,1 the practice has not been sufficiently studied. Ethnic profiling constitutes 
discrimination and thus breaches fundamental human rights norms, but it has not been 
expressly outlawed by any European government. Profiling is also counterproductive. 
It misdirects law enforcement resources and alienates some of the very people whose 
cooperation is necessary for effective crime detection.
Ethnic profiling may result from the intentional racism of individual police offi-
cers, but is frequently the cumulative result of unconscious and unchecked ethnic ste-
reotypes. It can also reflect institutional factors, such as police deployment patterns that 
do not reflect overt racial animus, but nonetheless have disparate impacts on minorities. 
Stop and search powers are a basic tool of policing and the primary point of contact with 
police for most people; yet their impact and effectiveness are rarely examined. 
Over 18 months, starting in January 2007, the Open Society Justice Initiative 
worked with police forces and civil society organizations in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain 
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to monitor the use of police stops in a project supported by the European Commission’s 
AGIS Programme titled “Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search project,” or 
STEPSS. The participating organizations and individuals not only had the foresight to 
recognize that they might have a problem with ethnic profiling, but were also willing to 
tackle the issue directly and share their experiences.
The STEPSS project was a three-country initiative designed to improve police-
minority relations through the more accountable and effective use of police powers in 
selected communities. Through the project, participating police forces developed tools 
to monitor the use of identity checks and stop and search powers, to determine whether 
they affect minority communities in a disproportionate manner, and to enable an analy-
sis of their effectiveness in detecting and investigating crime.
STEPSS project activities included an audit of current policies, practices, and 
training; a study tour of several sites in England; development of new guidelines, train-
ing methods, and a monitoring tool; and the monitoring of stops and ID checks for a 
period of six months. Community consultation was integral to each step of the project 
process, with the monitoring results used to further police-community discussion of 
public safety policies and resource allocation, and to support the development, where 
necessary, of alternative approaches to local crime and safety problems. 
STEPSS aimed to improve police relations with minority communities through:
• Improving police training, operational and legal guidance, and the supervision of 
ID checks, stops, and searches.
• Developing a monitoring system that enhances police management of and 
accountability for stops.
• Creating a forum and increasing minority communities’ ability to participate in 
dialogue with the police and set local policing priorities
• Creating replicable models of good practice that can be disseminated regionally. 
STEPSS undertook an assessment of existing policy and practice, designed forms 
for recording stops, prepared and trained officers on operational protocols, and collected 
stop data for six months in pilot sites in each country. Throughout the process, police 
met with local community groups to share and discuss the stop data. The data revealed 
that police were engaging in ethnic profiling. In every pilot site, police were profiling 
people based on ethnicity or national origin. Minorities were more likely to be stopped, 
often more likely to be searched, but, almost without exception, were no more likely to 
be found to be offending than the majority group. In some cases, they were significantly 
less likely to be found offending than ethnic majority residents—but were subjected to 
profiling, nonetheless. 
The data also clearly showed that specific operations and types of deployment led 
to more ethnic profiling. When officers had greater discretion to make stops, minorities 
were stopped at an increasingly disproportionate rate. Requiring officers to gather stop 
data and record their grounds for the stop reduced discretion and increased the effective-
ness of officers’ use of stops. In both Hungary and Spain, officers in the STEPSS project 
tended to make fewer stops over the period that they were required to record stops, but 
the proportion of stops that produced an arrest or other positive law enforcement out-
come increased. When officers focus on developing clear and individualized grounds 
for stops, and are held accountable by supervisors, they are more effective.
Before reviewing the country data, it is important to note that some amount of 
ethnic profiling across European Union (EU) member states is driven by the domestic 
enforcement of immigration law.  Indeed, in Spain the Constitutional Court has ruled 
that police officers may use ethnicity as a factor in making decisions about immigration 
enforcement.2  Immigration enforcement does not, however, play a significant role in 
explaining the results of the STEPSS data gathering. While some police stops in Hun-
gary and Bulgaria, may have been motivated by immigration concerns (as each country 
had a pilot site near the border), the number of immigrants and non-Roma minorities 
in the two countries is extremely small and barely appears in the STEPSS data. Immi-
gration enforcement is a more pressing issue in Spain where large-scale migration is 
a recent and ongoing phenomenon. The Spanish National Police enforce immigration 
law; the municipal police and Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalan regional police) only do so 
at the request of national police authorities and were not conducting such operations 
during the period of STEPSS data gathering. Hence, for the purposes of the STEPSS 
project, the results were not affected by the reality that, in enforcing immigration law, 
as opposed to criminal law, relevant authorities may generally target their investigative 
activities at non-citizens. Rather, any targeting of immigrants indicated by project data 
raises a red flag, because, for the purposes of enforcing criminal law, police generally 
have no reasonable basis for assuming that immigrants (like ethnic minorities) are more 
or less likely to commit crimes than anyone else. The question of immigration enforce-
ment is nonetheless a serious one for any police service that may wish to introduce stop 
forms while also engaged in enforcing immigration controls. In this case, the data from 
stop forms could provide useful insights into the degree to which immigration does in 
fact drive profiling of legal immigrants, and how effective such operations are in terms 
of identifying illegal migrants when weighed against the burden of their impact on legal 
immigrants and minority-origin citizens.
Country and Pilot Site Results
Throughout Hungary, Roma3 are three times more likely to be stopped by police 
than non-Roma, yet the rate at which each group is detected in the commission of an 
offense is almost identical. The disparity in the stop rate is particularly disturbing given 
that Hungarian police conduct massive numbers of stops: as many as 325 per 1,000 
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residents in one pilot site, 65 per 1,000 and 93 per 1,000 in the other two, compared 
to an average of 29 per 1,000 in the two Spanish STEPSS sites, and 39 stops and 20 
stops and searches per 1,000 in the United Kingdom.4 The stop data clearly showed that 
Hungarian officers’ stops are not detecting crime: only one percent of their stops lead to 
arrest; two percent lead to short-term arrest,5 and 18 percent to petty offense procedures 
being instigated (a broad category of minor administrative infractions and misdemean-
ors). Large numbers of people are inconvenienced by police stops with little result, and 
those people are disproportionately Roma. However, during the STEPSS project, officers 
in the Budapest and Szeged pilot areas significantly decreased their use of stops; this 
drop was accompanied by an increase in the rate at which stops produced results. 
In Spain, some ethnic minority groups were stopped more than others, but all 
ethnic minorities were stopped more—sometimes far more—than ethnic Spaniards.6 In 
Girona, the municipal police stopped Moroccans 6.7 times more often than Spaniards, 
and Romanians 10 times more often. Yet they only detected offenses in nine percent of 
stops of Moroccans compared to 17 percent of stops of ethnic Spaniards and 19 percent 
of stops of Romanians. The Mossos d’Esquadra (the regional police that also patrols 
Girona) not only stopped ethnic groups more often (Romanians were stopped 6.1 times 
more often, and Moroccans 10 times more often than Spaniards), they also searched 
ethnic minorities at highly disproportionate rates (70 percent of Moroccans stopped and 
77 percent of Romanians who were stopped were searched, compared to 52 percent of 
Spaniards). Only in the case of Romanians does this discrepancy appear to have some 
basis, as the police detected offenses slightly more frequently (17 percent of the time 
compared to eight percent for Spaniards and 11 percent for Moroccans). The overall 
picture is one of disproportionate treatment of ethnic minority groups with little or no 
basis in greater police efficiency. 
In Fuenlabrada, the second Spanish pilot site, the municipal police had rates of 
disproportionality similar to those in Girona at the start of the project. Over the six 
months of data gathering, the police in Fuenlabrada reduced the disproportionality in 
the rate at which they were stopping all persons of immigrant origin. They achieved a 
dramatic decrease in stops of Moroccans from 9.6 times more often than Spaniards to 
3.4 times more often, largely because they ended a fruitless counter-terror operation. 
Furthermore, the rate at which officers conducted stops overall fell by well over half, 
while the percentage of their stops that produced positive outcomes increased by nearly 
three times. Fuenlabrada’s police managers and supervisors achieved these remark-
able results by making systemic use of the STEPSS data both for closer supervision of 
individual patrol officers and for force-wide management of operations and personnel 
deployment. The data enabled them to factor disproportionate ethnic impacts into their 
strategic decision-making and reduce unfair policing while enhancing efficiency.
Unfortunately, in Bulgaria, insufficient support from mid-level police managers—
despite the commitment of national police leaders—and flaws in project implementa-
tion meant that not enough data were gathered to be statistically valid. The STEPSS 
experience in Bulgaria nonetheless offers valuable lessons in the challenges that data-
driven police reform initiatives face. Challenges were also confronted in other pilot sites 
in Hungary and Spain. These challenges include the difficulty of achieving the “buy-in” 
and commitment of officers from every level of the force; the challenges of working 
with local community organizations; as well as more technical difficulties involving the 
design of stop forms, data entry, and training. Although ethnic data collection is a con-
troversial concept in most European Union member states, where many governments 
argue that data protection standards preclude the collection of information on ethnic-
ity and policing, the national data protection authorities in the participating countries 
reviewed and approved of the stop forms and the systems for storing ethnic statistics, 
finding that they did not violate EU or national standards.
Proponents of ethnic profiling claim that it is simply part of “good policing” and 
crime prevention, because minority groups are more likely to be involved in crime. Cor-
roborating other studies, STEPSS demonstrates that this is simply not true. Previous 
studies suggest that profiling is ineffective and even counterproductive.7 Police need to 
have legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. People must have confidence that the police will 
act fairly and effectively within the law. One of the most gratifying results of STEPSS 
was the discussions and new relationships forged through the police-community groups 
and civilian engagement in monitoring police stops. In Fuenlabrada, these discussions 
directly helped the municipal police in identifying and addressing crime patterns and 
other community concerns. In Hungary, where the project used regular “ride-alongs” to 
monitor the data gathering, the police and Roma representatives developed new under-
standings and insights; one unanticipated outcome is that one of the Roma STEPSS 
participants has now joined the police force. 
The United Kingdom and the United States have grappled with disproportionality 
in stop and search or racial profiling (in the terminology of each setting) over decades 
and continue to do so. Beyond the basic issue of recognizing that police use of stop 
and search may have a discriminatory impact on ethnic minorities, understanding and 
changing the factors that drive ethnic profiling is a complex undertaking involving cul-
ture and practice, institutions and communities. STEPSS project partners undertook an 
ambitious series of activities over a short project timespan; they have helped to deepen 
our understanding of the dynamics of ethnic profiling and the ways in which it may be 
addressed. These achievements, and the challenges faced along the way, have produced 
valuable lessons both for the pilot sites continuing this work and for others adopting 
and adapting the STEPSS approach.
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STEPSS shows that, while it is not easy, it is possible, even in a short period of 
time, to identify and begin to address patterns of disproportionality—and that doing 
so does not jeopardize safety. Indeed it enhances the efficiency and effectiveness with 
which officers use stop and search powers. The challenge ahead is to build upon and 
deepen the use of stop data to strengthen community-police consultation and institu-
tionalize results-based management of the use of stops, including examining dispropor-
tionality, effectiveness, and the quality of encounters. 
Recommendations8
 
The following recommendations address national and local political authorities as well 
as police managers regarding the need to recognize ethnic profiling and address it 
through changes in police policies and practices. Further recommendations on the use 
of ethnic data gathering as a key tool for monitoring discrimination and establishing 
fair and effective policing are directed to civil society and community leaders. These 
recommendations are complemented by boxes with specific lessons from the STEPSS 
project, described in Chapter IV.
To national political authorities: 
1. Speak out against discrimination in all its forms, including ethnic profiling. 
Political leaders at all levels play an important role in shaping public opinion 
and should use their authority to speak out against discrimination and ethnic 
profiling.
2. Review laws and operational guidelines establishing and regulating police powers 
and, where necessary, strengthen non-discrimination standards and practices. 
Law and operational guidance should establish clear and precise standards for 
initiating and conducting stops, identity checks, and searches, including their 
function and grounds for carrying them out. Stops should be based upon a 
reasonable individualized suspicion that the subject in question has committed 
or is in the act of committing a crime. Law and/or police operational guidelines 
should clarify the nature of “suspicion” and state categorically that ethnicity and 
other personal characteristics may not constitute the reason for a stop (in the 
absence of a specific suspect description). 
3. Create robust public-complaint mechanisms if they are not already well-est-
balished, preferably including specialized independent oversight or control mech-
anisms. Civilian oversight can enhance the legitimacy of the complaints process 
and improve policing by identifying problematic practices.
To police authorities and managers: 
4. Reach out to ethnic and religious minority communities through public forums 
and discussion to enhance mutual understanding and trust; develop community-
policing initiatives; and create specialized ethnic and religious outreach units in 
the police, among other approaches. 
5. Recruit candidates from immigrant or minority groups to create a police service 
representative of the community that it serves. Complement minority recruitment 
with policies that support institutional non-discrimination and minority 
retention. 
6. Avoid using using explicit information about ethnic origin in public statements 
unless it is directly relevant and necessary. In the release of information about 
crimes, there is generally no need to discuss the ethnicity of victims or perpetra-
tors; all such reports should treat all subjects equally. In releasing statistics on 
crime rates, arrests, and other policing matters, it is important for police to be eth-
nically neutral, to avoid creating unwarranted associations between immigrants, 
minorities, and crime. For example, arrests on immigration grounds should be 
recorded separately from arrests on non-immigration grounds. Implement a 
monitoring system to record stops and ethnicity in order to detect and address 
any patterns of disproportionality and increase the effectiveness of officers’ use of 
stops. 
7. Verify that ethnic data collection complies with personal data protection standards. 
Stop forms and protocols must be reviewed by national data protection bodies. 
8. Analyze stop data on a regular basis and in consultation with the community, to 
maximize the value of the data for police supervision and management. 
9. Share stop data with the community. Police should establish regular consultations 
with community members, particularly those from minority groups, as a regular 
institutional policy. Such meetings can increase police accountability to the com-
munity, and can also aid in gathering information on crime problems, settling 
local policing priorities, and finding solutions to crime and other community 
concerns.
10. Review and, if necessary, strengthen the supervision of patrol officers’ use of stops 
and searches, to determine if the stops and searches are fair and effective; manag-
ers should also use stop forms to check the reasons officers give for making stops, 
as well as their conduct during stops. 
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11. Train police managers in using stop form data to supervise officers’ use of identity 
checks, stops, and searches. (See chart in Chapter V for further details on manage-
ment and supervision uses of stop form data.)
12. Give all police officers practical training on the use of stop and search powers, 
including a discussion of the influence of negative stereotypes, and guidance on 
the need to focus on suspicious behaviors rather than appearance. 
13. Complement data gathering with steps to assure courteous treatment of all mem-
bers of the public during police stops. Clear standards, training, and supervision 
will improve officer conduct during stops. Compliance with established stand-
ards should be enhanced or enforced through mechanisms that obtain feedback 
from citizens (such as comment boxes, surveys sampling persons stopped, and 
qualitative monitoring through community consultative groups or youth outreach 
programs).
To civil society and community leaders: 
14. Advocate for policies that promote non-discrimination in policing.
15. Study police-community relations and the use of police powers to build under-
standing of the dynamics of disproportionality and support the development of 
policies and initiatives in response.
16. Engage in dialogue with police and political authorities, to build trust and under-
standing.
17. Support efforts by police to monitor identity checks and stops and searches; 
demand that statistical data be shared to support joint assessment of policing 
tactics and local security priorities.
II. What is Ethnic Profiling and 
 How Did STEPSS Address It?
The term “ethnic profiling” refers to the use of race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin 
rather than individual behavior as the basis for making law enforcement decisions about 
who may be involved in criminal activity. Ethnic profiling appears most frequently in law 
enforcement officers’ decisions about who to stop and ask for identify papers, question, 
search, and sometimes arrest. Carrying out identity checks and stops and searches is 
one of the most basic tools of policing, yet their use, their impact, and their efficiency 
are rarely examined.9
There is little clarity or consensus in Europe today about what constitutes ethnic 
profiling and even less about how to address it. Specific definitions of ethnic profiling 
vary along a continuum ranging from the intentional use of race alone to the conscious 
or unconscious use of race along with other factors as the reason for the stop. Narrow 
definitions say that ethnic profiling occurs when officers make the decision to stop solely 
on the basis of a person’s perceived ethnicity. The narrow definition of ethnic profiling 
fails to capture the reality of policing on the streets during which officers base decisions 
on a number of factors that may include or be related to a person’s perceived ethnicity. 
Ethnic profiling may be caused by the purposefully racist behavior of individual officers, 
but it may also result from the unconscious use of racist stereotypes, and it can reflect 
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institutional factors such as unequal enforcement of the law or deployment patterns that 
have a disparate impact on ethnic minority groups.
Ethnic profiling is distinct from “criminal profiling,” which relies on statistical 
categorizations based on identifiable characteristics believed to correlate with certain 
behaviors, such as serial killer, hijacker, or drug courier profiles that have been devel-
oped. Ethnicity is frequently and properly used to compile “suspect profiles” or suspect 
descriptions, generally based on a witness description of a person connected with a 
particular crime committed at a specific time and place.
Proponents of ethnic profiling claim that it is simply part of “good policing” and 
crime prevention as minority groups are more likely to be involved in crime. Corrobo-
rating other studies, the data presented in this report demonstrate that this is simply 
not true. Studies suggest that profiling is ineffective and even counterproductive. Police 
need to have legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and people must have confidence that 
the police will act fairly and effectively within the law. Ethnic profiling is ineffective 
because it destroys the trust of communities in the police and reduces their willingness 
to cooperate in criminal or terrorism investigations or turn to the police to control crime 
in their neighborhoods. It also exacts a high price on individuals, groups, and communi-
ties that are singled out for disproportionate attention. For the individual stopped and 
detained, the experience can be frightening and humiliating. Ethnic profiling also serves 
to stigmatize whole groups as “suspect communities,” contributing to the over-repre-
sentation of ethnic minorities in other parts of the criminal justice system, perpetuating 
negative stereotypes and legitimizing racism.
Human rights reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that ethnic profiling is 
widespread in Europe, yet the issue has been subject to little systematic research. In 
2005, the Open Society Justice Initiative undertook research with partners in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Spain,10 using a qualitative approach based on interviews with police offi-
cers, focus groups and interviews with Roma in all three countries, and interviews with 
immigrants in Spain. In Bulgaria and Hungary, the research also included a household 
survey of peoples’ experiences and perception of police use of stops. Despite the very 
different national contexts, it was clear that police in all three countries were profiling 
Roma and other minorities. Roma pedestrians in Bulgaria and Hungary and immigrants 
in Spain were more likely to be stopped than members of the majority population and, 
once stopped they were more likely to report an unpleasant experience with the police. 
The interviews also found that officers frequently cited often unobjective and unverifi-
able factors such as a “sixth sense,” or “intuition” or “past experience” as driving their 
decisions about whom to stop, sometimes adding factors such as a person appearing 
“nervous,” “out of place,” or “strange.”11 The research found that while stops may be 
called in to headquarters, they are generally not reviewed by line supervisors at local 
stations, nor are they recorded and assessed systematically to measure their efficiency 
and fairness. 
The research in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain provided initial insights into eth-
nic differences in stops. Yet methodological variations in the research—particularly the 
dearth of data on the ethnicity of those stopped—made it impossible to determine the 
extent of ethnic profiling taking place. Ethnic statistics are essential to identify discrimi-
natory outcomes, including those that result from policies or patterns of practice that do 
not necessarily reflect discriminatory intent. The collection of ethnic data is necessary 
to determine the extent of any profiling, demonstrate its impact on minority groups, 
and provide effective redress.12 
To date, the United Kingdom is the only EU member state systematically collect-
ing data on police stops and ethnicity. Data collection has not ended the problem in the 
United Kingdom—black and Asian British people are still stopped more than whites—
but it has provided the basis for open and informed discussion between the police and 
local communities about the reasons for these disparities, and helped in developing 
policies to respond to them. Without data gathering, the problem of ethnic profiling is 
far more likely to go unrecognized, uncharted, and unaddressed. 
Building on research and lessons learned from the United Kingdom, the STEPSS 
project developed tools and processes to monitor police stops. A stop form that included 
data on the ethnicity of the person stopped was created, and the findings were discussed 
with committees made up of representatives of local minority communities. Through 
this process, STEPSS hoped to show that disproportionate stops of minorities (i.e. ethnic 
profiling) can be reduced without negative consequences for policing, and that police-
community relations will be improved as a result. STEPSS was launched in January 
2007, and carried out by five police forces over 22 months in eight pilot sites in Spain, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria. STEPSS project objectives were to:
(1) identify and reduce disproportionality in identity checks and stops and searches 
of ethnic minority and immigrant communities; 
(2) increase the efficiency of police stops through improved management and super-
vision; and
(3) improve police-community relations by sharing and discussing stop data and 
reviewing security concerns and operational priorities; 
(4) create models of good practice to share with other police forces.
STEPSS undertook the same basic set of activities in each country—with many 
adaptations to local realities—led by coordination teams composed of police, commu-
nity, and civil society representatives. The STEPSS process to measure and address 
ethnic profiling involved: 
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• auditing of existing law, policies, and practices;
• learning from other police forces, including through a study tour in the United 
Kingdom and visits by U.K. police officers to pilot sites in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Spain;
• developing new guidelines for the use of stops and searches, including instruc-
tions on making stops based on reasonable suspicion;
• developing a stop form and reviewing compliance with national data protection 
authorities;
• training police officers  in the objectives of the project, the concept of ethnic 
profiling, and the use of stop forms and operational guidance; 
• training community members in the same way police officers were trained; in 
addition, community members also provided training to police on local minority 
communities and experiences of being stopped;
• using forms to gather data on stops for six months, from October 2007 to 
April/May 2008;
• sharing stop data on a monthly basis with consultative committees made up of 
local residents; and
• completing an analysis of all data on stops and presenting the findings of that 
analysis.
More detail on the project sites is given below.
B U L G A R I A
Police: Bulgaria has a single national police force under the Ministry of the Interior, 
made up of various agencies responsible for crime detection and prevention, public 
order, and control of highway traffic.
STEPSS project sites: Fifth Area Police Department (APD) in the capital Sofia, Third 
Area Police Department in the city of Plovdiv, and the Area Police Department of 
the town of Haskovo. The participating police departments were chosen by the 
Ministry of the Interior, which endeavored to select both small and large towns, 
with commuting and permanently-resident ethnic minority groups.
Population: The 2001 census registered 6,605,000 ethnic Bulgarians, 747,000 
ethnic Turks, and 371,000 Roma. Yet Roma leaders and demographic experts 
suggest that the number of Roma is much higher, with estimates ranging between 
600,000 and 750,000.
H U N G A R Y
Police: Hungary has a single national police force under the Ministry of Justice and 
Law Enforcement.
STEPSS project sites: Sixth District Budapest, Szeged, and Kaposvár. These are 
policing districts with differing populations, crime profiles, and resources. Buda-
pest’s Sixth District covers a busy city center that includes Budapest’s main railway 
station and a large retail area; Szeged is a medium sized district on the Romanian 
border with a population of 200,000; and Kaposvár is a rural district with 120,000 
inhabitants.
Population: Hungary has a total population of 10,045,000 of which it is estimated 
that 620,000 or 6.2 percent are Roma. All other ethnic groups make up less than 
0.5 percent of the population. 
S P A I N
Police: Spain has two national police forces: the Policía Nacional and the Guar-
dia Civil Española; a regional police force in Catalunya (known as the Mossos 
d’Esquadra) and in the Basque country; and local, municipal police throughout 
Spain. 
STEPSS project sites: Fuenlabrada (a suburb south of Madrid), and Girona 
(in Catalunya).
Population: Spain has a total population of 46 million, including 4.5 million 
foreign residents. Fuenlabrada’s total population is 209,102 of whom 15.9 percent 
are foreigners; Girona’s total population is 96,461 of whom 20.7 percent are 
foreigners.
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III. Explaining Stop Patterns: 
 Key Terms and Concepts
In order to understand, measure, and address ethnic profiling by police, it is important 
to have a common understanding of its chief components. The terms and concepts 
described here were essential elements of the project’s conception.
Numbers of stops: The extent to which police forces use their stop powers varies greatly 
among police forces, reflecting crime rates, numbers of operational officers, and polic-
ing styles. The stop rate is generally presented as the number of stops per 1,000 people 
in the residential population. In 2006–2007 police forces within England and Wales 
conducted 39 stops and 20 stops and searches per 1,000 residents.13 
Measuring Fairness: Fairness is assessed in terms of: (a) disproportionality in the rate 
at which ethnic minority and majority residents are stopped, in relation to their num-
bers in the wider population;14 and (b) the treatment of people once they have been 
stopped.
Disproportionality is calculated by using police records to measure the rates at which 
people from ethnic minority groups are stopped, compared to the rates at which the 
majority group is stopped. The clearest way to understand disproportionality is by using 
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an odds ratio, which can be best understood by the sentence, “black people are X times 
more likely to be stopped than white people.” If stops are being conducted equally 
against all ethnic groups the ratios would be 1.0 indicating that black people are no more 
likely to be stopped that white people. Odds ratios between 1.0 and 1.5 are most likely 
benign; an odds ratio greater than 1.5 indicates ethnic profiling.15 Evidence of dispro-
portionality does not automatically prove discrimination; the data have to be examined 
further to look at what patterns emerge and how such patterns might be explained. 
For example, the first proven case of racial profiling in the United States, found 
that black motorists were 4.9 times more likely to be stopped than other drivers by the 
New Jersey State Police.16 U.K. statistics for 2006–2007 show that black people were 
2.4 times more likely to be stopped than white people, and Asian people were 1.1 times 
more likely to be stopped.17 The largest odds ratio documented to date is a study find-
ing that non-Slavs were 21.8 times more likely than Slavs to be stopped on the Moscow 
Metro.18
Police treatment of the person they have stopped, or the quality of the stop, has been 
found to be the greatest concern to people stopped.19 It is challenging to find objective 
measures of stop quality, but studies have assessed how long stops take, how often they 
lead to searches, the hit rate (or percentage of stops revealing a crime or other violation), 
and use of force (such as handcuffs or physical restraints). In the United Kingdom, in 
2006–2007, black people were 7.7 times more likely to be searched than white people 
and Asian people were 2.2 times more likely to be searched than white people.20 A study 
of traffic stops in Las Vegas, Nevada, showed that black and Latino people were more 
likely to be handcuffed and held for longer periods of time during stops.21
Effectiveness: The hit rate is a common measure of the effectiveness of stops (sometimes 
termed productivity). Yet police services do not have a consistent definition of what con-
stitutes a “hit.” Consequently, hit data cannot be compared across police jurisdictions 
without first carefully assessing the types of outcomes that each service considers a 
hit. The United Kingdom measures arrests resulting from stops and searches, whereas 
many U.S. jurisdictions include all positive outcomes, including seizure of contraband, 
administrative or traffic citations, and arrests.22 It is sometimes said that stops have a 
disruptive or deterrent effect, and that they have value in allowing intelligence gathering 
through questioning those stopped; however, research has been unable to determine 
the extent of these impacts.23
It is often argued that ethnic minorities and immigrants are profiled because 
they offend at higher rates. But data on hit rates from different cities and countries 
are remarkably consistent in showing that hit rates do not vary significantly by ethnic 
group. In the United Kingdom, in 2006–2007, the arrest rate for whites and blacks who 
were stopped was 12 percent, while it was 10 percent for Asians.24 In 1999, New York 
City police had an arrest rate following stops of 12.6 percent for whites, 11.5 percent for 
Latinos, and 10.5 percent for blacks.25 If foreign or ethnic minority groups were com-
mitting more crime, they should be found to be breaking the law more often. In some 
contexts, the hit rate is actually lower for certain minority or foreign groups, suggesting 
lower offending rates. The data show that profiling immigrants and minorities is not 
productive.26 
Reasons for stops: The effectiveness of police stops is strongly linked with the “grounds” 
or reason for which the stop was conducted. Across the European Union, police powers 
to conduct stops vary widely, from near total freedom to conduct identity checks, as in 
Hungary, to requiring that the officer have “reasonable suspicion” or an objective basis 
to think that a person has offended or is about to be involved in a crime, as in the United 
Kingdom.27 When officers are required to record the reason for their suspicion, this 
information can be analyzed to see whether minority ethnic groups are being targeted 
for specific offenses, and whether the stops are in fact productive. 
Discretion: The term discretion describes police officers’ ability to decide when and when 
not to stop, check identity, search, and generally enforce the law. Police officers make 
the decision to stop and search people on the street, where they are often removed from 
direct supervision and thus have a great deal of discretion. However, these decisions are 
likely to be influenced by operational factors. It is possible to make a distinction between 
high- and low-discretion stops and searches.28 High discretion stops and searches tend 
to be self-initiated activities by officers, whereas low-discretion stops refer to actions 
that have been directed by external factors, such as being called to an incident, infor-
mation about an earlier incident providing suspect descriptions, and activity in relation 
to specific targeted operations.29 Where levels of discretion are highest, officers’ gen-
eralizations and stereotypes about likely offenders have greater scope for influencing 
decisions.30
In the United Kingdom, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) gov-
erns police stops (except in alternative specific circumstances such as section 60 public 
order authority or section 44 counter-terror authority.31) Under PACE, police stops must 
be based on “reasonable suspicion” that the person has committed or is about to commit 
a crime. There is no similar requirement for section 60 stops, which were originally 
authorized for use at sporting events and similar circumstances, and which may be 
used over a limited time and in a defined area where there is the threat of serious vio-
lence or of people carrying weapons. Accordingly, officers enjoy more discretion when 
they conduct section 60 stops in the designated area.32 Data for 2006–2007 show that 
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under section 60, black people  were 16.9 times more likely to be stopped and searched 
than white people, while Asian were 3.4 times more likely to be stopped and searched 
than whites when compared to their numbers within the residential population.33 The 
number of arrests resulting from high-discretion stops is consistently lower.34 Only 
3.6 percent of stops and searches conducted pursuant to section 60 led to arrest in 
2006–2007, significantly lower than the 12 percent arrest rate under the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard for stops.35 
An examination of the grounds—the individualized factors that have led the offi-
cer to make the stop—recorded by officers36 can determine whether searches meet the 
legal threshold of suspicion. In a 1999 study in New York City, the justification provided 
by officers for 15.4 percent of stops did not meet the legal standards and a quarter of the 
stop forms did not provide sufficient detail to determine if reasonable suspicion was 
present.37 The absence of reasonable grounds can indicate that stop powers are being 
used for speculative “fishing expeditions” in the hope of discovering crime, or for other 
purposes such as asserting authority or maintaining order. Evidence that stops and 
searches without reasonable grounds are being used disproportionately against minority 
groups may indicate discrimination.
IV. STEPSS Data Analysis 
 and Results
The stop data gathered by the STEPSS project clearly show that police in all three coun-
tries were engaged in ethnic profiling of minorities and immigrants. Minorities and 
immigrants were more likely to be stopped, often more likely to be searched, but, almost 
without exception, were no more likely to be found to be offending than the majority 
group. In some cases, they were significantly less likely to be found offending than 
majority residents. The data also demonstrate important benefits of monitoring stops 
in reducing levels of disproportionality and increasing the effectiveness of stops. During 
the project period, participating officers reduced the number of stops they made, but the 
proportion of stops that produced an arrest or other law enforcement outcome increased. 
This result is clearest in Fuenlabrada, but can also be seen in two pilot sites in Hungary, 
and is suggested by the Girona data. Further benefits can be seen in Fuenlabrada, where 
police managers and supervisors used the stop data to supervise individual officers more 
closely, and to examine the impact of specific operations and personnel deployments. 
The data enabled them to factor disproportionate ethnic impacts into their strategic 
decision-making and reduce unfair policing while enhancing efficiency. 
Unfortunately, Bulgarian patrol officers failed to comply with STEPSS protocols 
and insufficient data were gathered to support a valid analysis. Nonetheless, the STEPSS 
experience in Bulgaria offers valuable lessons about the challenges inherent in measur-
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ing and addressing disproportionality. These challenges are explored further in the next 
chapter.  
Fuenlabrada, Spain
During the six month pilot period of October 2007 through March 2008, the Fuen-
labrada Municipal Police conducted 3,050 stops.38 On an annual basis, this equates to 
29 stops per 1,000 residents of Fuenlabrada. 
Chart 1: 
Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Change in number of stops and searches over time 
(October 2007–March 2008)
The number of recorded stops fell over the course of the project from 958 stops in 
October 2007 to 253 in March 2008. The number of searches conducted after stops also 
fell from 477 in October to 155 in March; and both stops and searches have continued at 
the lower level since the pilot program ended. While the rate of stops went down, their 
effectiveness increased.




















Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Percentage of stops leading to positive results (Hit rate)
The total number of positive outcomes—or hits—in Fuenlabrada was slightly 
lower for the project period compared to the six months preceding the project, reflect-
ing the large drop in the number of stops made by officers.39 However, the percentage 
of stops leading to positive results (or “hit rate”) increased significantly as a result of 
the project. The improved hit rate suggests that the training and enhanced supervision 
implemented during the STEPSS project increased officer awareness of the criteria for 
using stops and improved their selection of people to stop. Stops were used more effec-
tively and yielded better results while inconveniencing fewer people in the process.
Table 1 shows the relation of stops to searches for different ethnic groups in Fuen-
labrada. Searches were conducted at roughly the same rate for all groups. But the hit rate 
varied significantly by group, from a hit rate of 17 percent for Spaniards, to a far lower 
seven percent rate for Moroccans, four percent for Romanians and Ecuadorians, two 
percent for Nigerians, and five percent for “others.”40 It is often argued that a dispro-
portionate targeting of ethnic minority or immigrant groups is justified by differential 
rates of criminal involvement. The data here show that, in Fuenlabrada, minorities are 
far less likely to be found breaking the law than Spanish people and, consequently, it is 
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Table 1: 
Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Stops, searches, and hit rates by nationality group
Ethnicity Stops Searches Hit rate








Ecuadoran 139 74 53 5 4
Moroccan 319 166 52 23 7
Nigerian 133 46 35 2 2
Romanian 205 119 58 9 4
Spanish 1.886 1.028 55 327 17
Other 368 185 50 28 5
TOTAL 3.050 1.618 53 394 13
 The aggregate data for the entire period show that minorities were in fact more 
likely to be stopped than ethnic Spaniards. The odds ratios show that Moroccans were 
6.3 times more likely to be stopped than Spaniards, Romanians were 3.8 times more 
likely, Ecuadorians 3.9 times more likely, Nigerians 5.2 times more likely, and all other 
groups 2.1 times more likely to be stopped than Spanish people. The odds ratios are all 
greater than the 1.5 benign range and indicate that police are targeting immigrants.
Yet, there was an important reduction in levels of disproportionality during the 
project as shown in the chart below, which gives the odds ratio for each immigrant 
group by month. In the case of Moroccans the drop is particularly striking, from an 
odds ratio of 9.6 to one of 3.4. The drop in disproportionality reflects the willingness 
of Fuenlabrada’s police to respond to community concerns and act upon the data. This 
is appropriate, because the hit rate data clearly showed that targeting minorities was 
not effective. The spike in stops of Nigerians in December reflects an anti-prostitution 
operation.
Chart 3:
Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Disproportionality ratios over time (October 2007–March 2008)
In addition to nationality, the STEPSS stop forms noted the type of operation 
under which the stop was conducted.41 The majority of stops were conducted during 
operations focused on specific geographic areas or zones. A smaller number of stops 
were conducted on persons suspected of being wanted in relation to a previous offense 







October November December January February March
October November December January February March
Spain 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Romania 5.2 4.4 3.6 1.7 2.0 4.8
Morocco 9.6 6.9 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4
Ecuador 5.0 3.7 5.4 2.2 5.3 2.0
Nigeria 4.0 7.9 11.5 2.1 1.8 1.4
Others 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.6 2.4 1.4
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Type of Operation
Preventive operation: Operations designed to prevent crime and disorder. 
A counter-terrorism operation carried out during the project period fell into 
this category.
“Hot spot operation” or zone under intensive police control: Operations 
focused on specific areas or zones where intelligence indicates that certain 
crimes or infractions are being committed.
Identification of person wanted for administrative infraction or criminal 
offense: Stops conducted when it is believed that the person is wanted in 
relation to a previous offense or fits a suspect description. 
Alleged uncivil conduct: Stops conducted in response to public disorder 
or perceived uncivil behavior, such as noisy drinking in public or playing 
loud music.
Suspicious attitude or behavior: Stops based on perceived suspicious 
behavior, nervousness, and evasive behavior. 
Other: All other stops.
Chart 4:
Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Stops by operation type or reason over time 
(October 2007–March 2008)
The drop in stop rates during the project is primarily due to reduced use of three 
types of police operations: zones under intensive police control (also called “hot spot 
operations”), preventive operations, and stops for suspicious attitude or behavior. Stops 
under these categories fell by 90 percent, 76 percent and 56 percent respectively during 
the project period. 
During preventive and hot spot operations, officers are provided with guidelines 
on whom to stop, based on either the type of crime they are trying to prevent (such as a 
terrorist attack) or on intelligence that particular crimes are happening in specific areas. 
The project data suggest that in these types of operations patrol officers were more 
October November December January February March
Preventive operation 243 71 50 11 25 59
Zone under intensive police control 496 575 145 143 80 52
Wanted person for criminal 
or administrative offense
75 86 73 131 100 69
Alleged participation in uncivil conduct 70 38 18 63 25 45
Suspicious behavior or conduct 64 76 34 43 38 28
Others 10 5 4 5 0 0
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aggressive and used more speculative reasoning and stereotypes in deciding whom to 
stop. This may be because the officers themselves did not have to articulate the reason 
for a stop during these operations—the nature of the operation itself provided a reason.
Conversely, officers used stops more carefully and efficiently when they were 
required to justify the stops. The hit rates support this conclusion. Hit rates were higher 
for the three types of stops that require officers to be able to articulate grounds for stop-
ping someone: a 33 percent hit rate for identifying the perpetrator of a crime or admin-
istrative infraction; a 10 percent hit rate for alleged uncivil conduct; and a 15 percent hit 
rate for suspicious behavior. All of these are significantly higher than the three percent 
hit rate for preventive operations and the nine percent rate for hot spot operations.42 
The numbers of stops ascribed to “suspicious behavior” dropped by 56 percent 
during the STEPSS project. Suspicious behavior stops are high discretion stops based 
on an officer’s subjective assessment of behavior. Suspicious behavior stops accounted 
for nine percent of all stops of Spanish people, but 16 percent of all stops of Moroccan 
people and 12 percent of all stops of Romanians. The reduction of suspicious behavior 
stops during the project made an important contribution to the overall drop in dispro-
portionality for Moroccans and Romanians. 
It is useful to look at stop patterns of the two largest immigrant groups in Fuen-
labrada, Romanians and Moroccans, as they demonstrate the disproportionate impacts 
that certain operations have on specific groups.
Chart 5:














In October and November, large numbers of Romanian women were stopped (78 
and 62 respectively for each month; with odds ratios of 5.2 and 4.4). The vast majority 
of these stops (77 and 69 percent respectively) were conducted under hot spot opera-
tions targeting prostitution in one area. At the community consultation meetings, the 
police explained that they had received complaints about prostitution in that area and 
the operation was aimed at displacing prostitutes through the aggressive use of stops 
and outreach to prostitution support groups.43 The operation ended in December when 
the women moved out of the area, and the numbers of stops on Romanians fell dramati-
cally and were no longer concentrated under hot stop operations.44
Chart 6:
Fuenlabrada Municipal Police: Change over time in stops of Moroccans 
(October 2007–March 2008)
The pattern of stops on Moroccans throughout the project period is also illustra-
tive. The first two months of stop data showed high levels of stops of Moroccans—espe-
cially young Moroccan men—under preventive operations, hot spots, and suspicious 
behavior categories (28 percent, 37 percent and 16 percent respectively). As the num-
bers of stops conducted under these three operations fell dramatically, so did the level 















A D D R E S S I N G  E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  B Y  P O L I C E     3 5
3 6     S T E P S S  D A T A  A N A LY S I S  A N D  R E S U LT S
preventive operations fell by 97 percent over the course of the project. In October, there 
were 137 stops of Moroccans; that is 14 percent of all stops that month despite the fact 
that Moroccans represent only 2.2 percent of the residential population (an odds ratio 
of 9.6). Sixty-five of those 137 stops took place under a preventive operation conducted 
for counter-terrorism.45 As only one stop in October (and none in November) had a 
positive result, there was no clear operational impact in terms of law enforcement, but 
discussions in the monthly community meetings made clear the negative impact in 
the Moroccan community. In late November the police cancelled the operation. Since 
December, stops of Moroccans remained relatively steady, rising slightly in February, 
which the police explained was in response to an anti-drug dealing operation based on 
time-bound and area specific intelligence (a hot spot operation).
Girona, Spain46 
In reviewing data from Girona, it is necessary to account for two police forces working 
the same area with different legal mandates, and different policing styles and levels of 
reliance on stops. The Girona Municipal Police are responsible for community polic-
ing, petty crime, and civic and administrative infractions, while the Mossos d’Esquadra 
regional police have responsibility for more serious crimes, and rely less on stops in 
their investigations. Also it is important to note that the Mossos d’Esquadra had special 
units operating in Girona that did not participate in the STEPSS project and were not 
recording their actions; this limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the data. 
During the six-month project period (which was the same in Girona and Fuenlabrada—
October 2007 to March 2008), the municipal police recorded 1,526 stops, and the Mos-
sos d’Esquadra recorded 902 stops.47 This equates to 32 stops per 1,000 residents for the 
municipal police, and 19 recorded stops per 1,000 residents for the Mossos d’Esquadra. 
Both forces make most stops at night, and primarily stop young men, but beyond these 
simple parallels their stop patterns vary considerably.
The number of stops made by the municipal police dropped in November and 
then continued at a steady level for the rest of the project period; searches also fell 
significantly in November, but then continued to decline more gradually for the rest of 
the project.
Chart 7:
Girona Municipal Police: Change over time in stops and searches (October 2007–March 2008)
The Mossos stop and search pattern is a little different, and shows a clear drop 
through the first part of the project period, followed by a return to previous levels. 
Several explanations are possible: this may reflect initial compliance with the STEPSS 
protocols followed by a loss of interest and reduction in recording stops, with a return 
to recording just before the end of the project; or it may reflect a temporary reaction 
against the stop forms as manifested by police carrying out fewer stops (called a “damp-
ening effect” or “de-policing”) with stops returning to former levels once officers became 
accustomed to completing the forms
Chart 8:
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In contrast to their varying stop and search rates, the hit rate pattern for each 
force is similar.48  The percentage of stops leading to a hit drops off significantly and 
then rises somewhat toward the end of the project period. For the Mossos d’Esquadra, 
this echoes the fall and rebound in the overall number of stops and searches, but it is 
unclear why the drop occurred for the municipal police. 
Chart 9:
Girona Municipal Police: Percentage of stops leading to positive results (Hit rate)
(October 2007–March 2008)
Chart 10:


























The Girona data do not show strong or consistent enough trends to draw firm 
conclusions. But it is worth noting that there is a clear correlation between a low number 
of recorded stops and higher hit rates, as can be seen in the November numbers for the 
municipal police and the February data for the Mossos in the above charts.
Table 2:
Girona Municipal Police: Odds ratios(October 2007–March 2008)49 
Nationality Stops Resident 
population
Stops per 1,000 
residents
Odds ratio
Honduran 920 2,557 35.9 3.9
Moroccan 244 3,930 62.0 6.7
Romanian 144 1,560 92.3 10.0
Spanish 707 76,483 9.2 1.0
Others 339 11,931 28.4 3.0
Foreigners are disproportionately targeted for stops by both police forces in Girona. 
The Mossos d’Equadra odds ratios were especially high: Moroccans were 6.7 times more 
likely to be stopped than a Spanish person, and Romanians 10 times more likely. The 
large number of youths in the immigrant population, and lifestyles involving greater 
presence on the street than Spaniards, means that these groups are more available to 
be stopped. Yet the disproportionality ratios are so high that even accounting for these 
factors, these groups are clearly being profiled by the police. 
Table 3:
Girona Mossos d’Esquadra: Odds ratios (October 2007–March 2008)
Nationality Stops Resident 
population
Stops per 1,000 
residents
Odds ratio
Honduran 30 2,557 11.7 2.1
Moroccan 213 3,930 54.1 10.0
Romanian 52 1,560 33.3 6.1
Spainish 415 76,483 5.4 1.0
Other 192 11,931 16.0 2.9
A D D R E S S I N G  E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  B Y  P O L I C E     3 9
4 0     S T E P S S  D A T A  A N A LY S I S  A N D  R E S U LT S
The data show that the Mossos d’Esquadra also disproportionally target their stops 
on certain foreign groups: Moroccans are 10 times more likely to be stopped than Span-
ish people, Romanians are 6.1 times more likely to be stopped; Hondurans are 2.1 times 
more likely to be stopped and all other groups are 2.9 times more likely to be stopped 
than Spanish people. These figures indicate ethnic profiling. 
Chart 11:
Girona Municipal Police: Diproportionality over time (October 2007–March 2008)
Charts 11 and 12 represent disproportionality ratios in both forces over the course 
of the project period. Disproportionality within the municipal police remained steady 
throughout: it rose slightly and then fell for Romanians but stayed at around the same 
rates for all other groups. Interestingly, the data for the Mossos d’Esquadra show that 
disproportionality actually rose during the project period and then fell to levels similar 
to those at the project’s beginning. Given the additional scrutiny that police officers were 
under during the project, it is surprising that they targeted foreigners in higher num-
bers during this time. It is possible that the rise in disproportionality reflects resistance 
to the project. Officers complained that the project was questioning their professional-
ism and in effect calling them racists. Another explanation is that the data were not 
October November December January February March
Spain 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Romania 2.7 19.8 9.1 13.3 13.5 10.3
Morocco 5.6 9.4 6.6 8.8 5.3 4.0
Honduras 1.6 3.5 5.8 6.8 2.5 5.0
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being analyzed and fed back to the police force in a regular manner, and therefore did 
not inform police practice—and perhaps prompt change—as they did in Fuenlabrada. 
Chart 12:
Girona Mossos d’Esquadra: Diproportionality over time (October 2007–March 2008)
October November December January February March
Spain 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Romania 9.1 3.8 6.3 6.4 6.1 5.0
Morocco 8.1 11.9 13.5 13.6 9.0 8.8
Honduras 1.2 3.1 2.5 8.6 0.0 0.7
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Table 4: 
Girona Mossos d’Esquadra: Stops, searches and hit rates by nationality group
Nationality Stops Searches Hit rate
Number Number Percentage of 
stops resulting 
in searches 
Number Percentage of 
stops resulting 
in a hits
Honduran 30 10 33 0 0
Moroccan 213 150 70 24 11
Romanian 52 40 77 9 17
Spanish 415 215 52 38 9
Others 192 103 54 14 7
TOTAL 902 518 57 85 9
What transpires immediately after a stop is equally important in detecting dis-
crimination and exploring issues of police effectiveness. The Girona data show that the 
municipal police searched an average of 37 percent of those they stopped, with a slightly 
higher rate for Romanians. In contrast, the Mossos d’Esquadra searched an average of 57 
percent of those they stopped. Although some minority groups were searched at lower 
rates, Moroccans and Romanians were searched by the Mossos d’Esquadra 70 and 77 
percent of the times that they are stopped, respectively. These numbers show that police 
officers are acting on the assumption that they are more likely to find illegal goods or 
weapons on immigrants. Yet the data show that this perception is wrong. Overall, the 
municipal police got positive results from 13 percent of their stops while the Mossos 
d’Esquadra got positive results from just nine percent of their stops. Most immigrant 
groups are no more likely than Spaniards to be found breaking the law. (Romanians 
were the exception.)50 The data clearly demonstrate that it is not productive to stop and 
search immigrants at greater rates than Spanish people in Girona.
“ M O R O C C A N S  C A R R Y  K N I V E S ”
Both police forces in Girona stop a highly disproportionate number of Moroccans 
and the hit rate for these stops is very low. Representatives of both police forces 
explained that this reflects self-protection measures taken by police officers who 
believe that Moroccans habitually carry knives. Data on hit rates show that in fact 
other nationalities, and Spaniards in particular, are more likely to carry weapons. 
The data clearly show that this “common knowledge” about Moroccans is a pejora-
tive stereotype.
Data gathered during the project period allow an analysis of the number of stops, 
searches, and positive results that were conducted under directed and non-directed 
operations.51 
Under directed operations, officers are told by commanding officers whom they 
should stop based on the type of crime the operation is meant to prevent or on the basis 
of intelligence about particular crimes in particular areas. Because directed operations 
are ordered by senior officers, the police on the street who are carrying out the operation 
do not have to justify their stops and thus have more leeway to indulge in stereotyping 
and generalizations. For this reason, directed operations are generally less effective 
than stops that individual officers have to justify to their commanders as based on well-
grounded suspicion. This highlights the need to improve the intelligence on which 
directed operations are based and provide better guidelines to officers on who to stop 
during such operations. It would also help if officers were required to justify their stops 
even during directed operations.
Chart 13:
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Chart 14:
Girona Mossos d’Esquadra: Type of operation and results (October 2007–March 2008)
Fifty-four percent of the municipal police stops were part of directed operations, 
whereas 42 percent of stops conducted by the Mossos d’Esquadra were part of directed 
operations. As in Fuenlabrada, stops conducted under directed operations are much less 
productive. Directed stops conducted by the municipal police had a hit rate of 10 per-
cent, compared to 17 percent for non-directed stops; for the Mossos d’Esquadra the hit 
rate for directed stops was six percent compared to 12 percent for non-directed stops. 
Hungary 
In Hungary, stop data were gathered between September 17, 2007 and March 17, 2008. 
Over this period, the police in the three pilot sites carried out 35,954 stops;52 of these, 
22,375 were recorded on the STEPSS forms. 
Table 5:










STEPSS forms completed 
compared to total number 
of stops (percentage)
Budapest 3,033 8 2,015 8 66
Kaposvár 22,089 61 13,506 55 61
Szeged 10,832 31 9,105 37 84



















Hungary: Stops per 1,000 population
Location Number of stops Estimated population Number of stops per 1,000 
population per year
Budapest53 6,065 65,000 65 stops per 1,000
Kaposvár54 44,177 122,000 325 stops per 1,000
Szeged55 23,633 203,000 93 stops per 1,000
The table above illustrates the number of people stopped per 1,000 of the esti-
mated local population. The numbers of stops conducted in the three pilot sites are 
staggeringly high. Hungarian law gives police much greater latitude for making stops 
than police in other EU countries enjoy. As a result, Hungarian police have contact with 
the general public through stops at much higher rates than police in other European 
countries.
Chart 15:
Hungary: Number of stops (September 2007–March 2008)
September October November December January February March
Kaposvár 2,327 3,631 3,282 3,204 4,429 4,573 4,324
Szeged 2,368 1,704 2,380 1,445 1,650 1,805 2,434
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The number of stops recorded in Hungary during the project period varied con-
siderably among the three cities, as seen in the table above. There were particularly 
conspicuous differences between Szeged and Kaposvár, with very high stop levels in 
the latter despite a substantially smaller population. The differences reflect recording 
practices and different policing styles. Following guidelines given by the county head-
quarters, the Kaposvár Police place greater emphasis on the use of stops for “screening 
and mapping.” This use of stops is questionable in light of the data on effectiveness.
In Hungary, the police define a successful stop (or “hit”) as one that yields any of 
the three following positive outcomes: (a) arrests; (b) short-term arrests;56 and (c) petty 
offense procedures initiated. Petty offenses are quasi-criminal offenses, the gravity of 
which does not reach the criminal level.57
The aggregate data from all three sites over the six month project period—includ-
ing traffic stops58—show that only one percent of stops led to arrest, two percent led to 
short term arrest, and 18 percent led to petty offense procedures being instigated. These 
are very low hit rates, indicating that large numbers of people were inconvenienced by 
police stops with little result. These data call into question the argument that extensive 
checks are an effective crime fighting tool and point to a great deal of time wasted by 
police conducting fruitless stops.
Chart 16:
Hungary: Grounds for stops (including traffic stops)
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
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0.5Finding a wanted person
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Of the stops recorded in Hungary during the project period, 37 percent were traffic 
stops. A relatively high proportion of stops, 19 percent, were petty offense stops; eight 
percent were conducted for intensive controls; and only two percent of stops were related 
to the suspicion of a criminal act. A third of the stops were recorded under the “other” 
category; and this rises to 50 percent when traffic stops are removed from the data.
Traffic stops and intensive control stops are often performed as part of large-scale 
operations, based on an order from a superior, with the objective of arresting a crimi-
nal suspect or preventing crime or violence. In these operations, all persons entering a 
specific area are stopped and their identity documents checked. Traffic stops—the most 
common type of stop—accounted for only 16 percent of the petty offense procedures 
initiated. The negligible hit rates for these types of stops indicate they were based on 
inadequate intelligence or insufficient instruction being given to officers, resulting in 
large numbers of people being stopped with little result. 
 In half the traffic stops and a third of pedestrian stops, the grounds for the stop—
as marked on the officer’s stop form—were given as “other.” Where officers checked the 
“other” box, the stop forms contained an open field for them to record the reasons for 
the stop. Many officers were unable to articulate any concrete grounds for stops listed as 
“other.” In 64 percent of these cases officers entered no information in the open field, 
and in 20 percent the information provided was unsatisfactory (for example, officers 
frequently indicated “general identity check” as the reason).59 Although the threshold for 
conducting stops in Hungary is extremely low, stops conducted for no reason or insuf-
ficient reason violate the Hungarian Police Act, which requires that stops have a specific 
purpose. When officers cannot articulate the reason for a stop, that stop is unlikely to 
produce a positive result. 
C H A N G E S  I N  N U M B E R S  O F  S T O P S  A N D 
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  I N  B U D A P E S T  A N D  S Z E G E D
In the Sixth District of Budapest there was a dramatic, 75.3 percent, decrease in 
stops (from 14,362 to 3,538) during the project period, as compared to the same 
period in the previous year. The decline in the number of stops was accompanied 
by an increase in overall effectiveness. Over the course of data gathering, 2,242 
petty offense proceedings were initiated compared to 977 such measures in the 
same period of the previous year—a 129 percent increase. The number of short-
term arrests remained stable (692 persons taken into custody compared to 683 
in the same period of the preceding year). There was a ten percent drop in the 
identification of persons wanted on an arrest warrant (which mirrors similar drops 
in this category nationwide).
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Chart 17:
Budapest, Hungary: Number of stops in September 2007–March 2008 compared to the number 
of stops in September 2006–March 2007
Supervisors explained that this sharp drop in the number of stops in the Sixth 
District could result from briefings that ordered officers to refrain from stopping 
a person unless they had concrete and identifiable grounds. Furthermore, officers 
faced the administrative burden of filling out the STEPSS form in addition to their 
regular forms. As one supervisor noted in the project evaluation interviews: 
Prior to the project, officers might have selected people randomly, but after the project started, 
officers knew that they had to have a firm reason for stopping people. It was explained in the 
briefing that the firm reason couldn’t be color of skin or clothes—so this could be the reason 
why the number of stops dropped dramatically.
In his view, because officers had to consider the grounds for their stops, they 
focused more on checking suspected perpetrators of petty and criminal offenses 
reflected in the increase in those categories. The decrease in arrests of persons 
found to have outstanding arrest warrants was explained by the overall number of 
stops carried out. In the six months following the end of STEPSS, the number of 
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Chart 18:
Szeged, Hungary: Number of stops in September 2007–March 2008 compared to the number of 
stops in September 2006–March 2007
In Szeged, the total overall number of stops dropped by 17.5 percent (from 16,724 to 
13,786) compared to the same period of the previous year. At the same time, overall 
efficiency seems to have increased. Although fewer petty offense proceedings were 
initiated (3,036 instead of 3,361) and fewer on-the-spot fines were imposed (2,718 
as opposed to 3,630), the number of short-term arrests and the number of persons 
with a pending arrest warrant who were identified and arrested increased slightly 
(from 605 to 611 and from 148 to 163 respectively). Senior officers explained that 
this increase was achieved by creating a specialized search unit whose sole purpose 
is finding and arresting wanted persons. The unit is using stops and identity checks 
not as a general screening method, but only on a targeted basis.
The decrease in the number of stops in Budapest’s Sixth District and Szeged was 
accompanied by an increase in the overall effectiveness of stops in these two pilot 
sites. The increased scrutiny of stops introduced as a result of the project led to a 
reduction in the numbers of stops. When officers focus on individualized suspicion 
rather than preconceptions about particular ethnic groups, they are more effective. 
The experience in Szeged also shows that targeted operations that do not rely on 
stops are more effective than the use of traffic or preventive operations that rely on 
stopping everyone. Results show that reducing stops through tightened supervi-
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Chart 19:
Hungary: Officer perception of people stopped (September 2007–March 2008)
The data from Hungary show that Roma were disproportionately targeted for 
stops; 22 percent of all persons stopped by police were Roma60 while 75 percent were 
identified as Caucasian. The remaining three percent were identified as black, Arab, 
Asian, or other. Population estimates vary but the most reliable put the Roma popula-
tion of Hungary at about 620,000 of the population of 10,045,000, or 6.2 percent.61 
Roma youth were especially likely to be targeted for stops: Roma youth ages 15 through 
19 make up 10.3 percent of the Roma population but accounted for 32 percent of all 
Roma who were stopped.62 
The disproportionality with which Roma were targeted for stops varied consider-
ably among the three pilot sites, as seen in the bar graph below.63
Chart 20:
Hungary: Percentage of stops on those perceived to be Roma compared to their estimate per-
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The odds ratios for each area are: 3.3 for Roma in Budapest; 3 for Szeged; and 2 
for Kaposvár (rising to 2.4 when traffic stops are excluded from the data set). 
The data also show considerable differences in the grounds under which ethnic 
groups are stopped. Roma are over-represented in almost every category. The dispropor-
tionality is particularly acute for high-discretion stops where negative stereotypes come 
into play, such as suspicion of petty offense or crime, possession of a legally prohibited 
item, possession of a suspicious object, prevention of an act jeopardizing public order, 
and “other.” In all of these scenarios, Roma are stopped disproportionately.
Chart 21:
Hungary: Grounds for stops by ethnicity (September 2007–March 2008)
Although Roma are stopped disproportionately, the hit rate is the same for Roma 
and non-Roma. At the national level, 78 percent of stops of Roma and 79 percent of 
stops of non-Roma produced no result—a virtually identical rate. Similarly, the percent-
age of stops followed by a petty offense proceeding for Roma and non-Roma was 19 and 
18 percent respectively. Rates of arrests and short term arrests are practically the same 
for the Roma and non-Roma samples. It is often argued that Roma are targeted because 
they have a higher rate of offending. The data do not support this assertion; the stop 
data find both Roma and non-Roma offending at very similar rates. 
When the data are differentiated by pilot site, a significant difference in hit rates 
emerges. In Budapest, 41 percent of stops of non-Roma, produced a positive result, 
but only 20 percent of stops of Roma did so. However, 33 percent of all the persons 
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stopped were Roma, even though they represent only five to ten percent of the Buda-
pest population. In both Budapest and Szeged, Roma were checked more often without 
any grounds than non-Roma; and in Szeged, like Budapest, only 18 percent of stops 
produced a positive result.
Chart 22:
Hungary: Efficiency of stops by ethnicity (September 2007–March 2008)
The data from Hungary clearly show that police are engaging in ethnic profiling 
against Roma, and that this discrimination leads to inefficient policing. 
B U L G A R I A N  D A T A
While the project design in Bulgaria did not vary from Spain or Hungary, the evalua-
tion of data revealed serious problems. Data review showed that only approximately 
30 percent of stops were recorded on the STEPSS stop forms. This number is too 
low to provide a reliable reflection of stop patterns in the Bulgarian pilot sites. The 
failure of officers to record their stops, and the fact that this non-compliance went 
unnoticed until the final evaluation, highlights both problems in project design and 
implementation, and structural issues within the Bulgarian Police. These problems 
hold some valuable lessons for Bulgaria and the STEPSS project more broadly. 
The evaluation highlighted a number of structural problems in the Directorate of 
Police. Police managers stated that the Bulgarian police’s militarized character 
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would aid project implementation: when instructed, officers would complete the 
stop forms. In practice, the hierarchy was a hindrance. Senior officers in the Security 
Police (which oversees patrol officers) supported the project enthusiastically, but 
while in theory central level decisions are mandatory for subordinates, in practice 
the patrol officers of the Security Police operate under the command of Area Police 
Departments (APDs) and their subordinate District Police Directorates (DPDs). 
Orders have to pass through the chain of command. STEPSS coordinators failed 
to engage directly with the directors of the APDs and line supervisors, and these 
officers failed to understand or support the project and resisted its implementation. 
They could do this with little concern for adverse consequences as there are no seri-
ous penalties for non-execution of an order for either district police commanders 
or patrol officers. Bulgarian policing has no culture of measuring productivity or of 
holding officers accountable for performance. A project introducing greater over-
sight was predictably resisted, and the lack of accountability mechanisms meant 
that there was little that senior officers in the central Security Police could do to 
rectify the problems. 
The project’s effort to adapt practices from the U.K. to a Bulgarian context failed to 
adequately account for the local context and its very different policing culture. For 
example, the stop form was detailed and complex (though the check-box structure 
was easier to complete than existing forms) and it had to be completed in addition 
to existing paperwork. This created significant additional work; in some cases as 
many as three forms had to be filled out, in addition to entering the data from the 
STEPSS form into a computer. This could take as much as 30 to 40 minutes for a 
single stop, an issue that was raised repeatedly during the post-project evaluation. 
In addition, line supervisors did not check officer compliance. Patrol officers did 
not hand in their stop forms daily, but kept the entire pad of forms until completed. 
As radio logs are only kept for a short period, it was impossible to cross-reference 
forms and radio logs to verify accuracy at the end of the project. There was also no 
mechanism for reviewing and correcting incomplete forms.
A series of problems with the database software and difficulties connecting the 
database to pilot stations led to a three month delay and backlog in data entry. 
Lack of computer skills meant that data entry was slow;64 the APDs eventually hired 
external data entry staff, but the delay meant that stop data were not available for 
analysis and discussion to either local police managers or to community members 
during the project, nor did officer non-compliance become clear until the project 
had ended. 
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V. The STEPSS Process
As previously outlined, STEPSS was designed as a common process for three coun-
tries, the elements of which were adapted to local conditions. This chapter reviews 
key principles and models for the process, with reflections on adaptations and lessons 
learned. The next sections follow a rough chronological order of the STEPSS project, 
from the policy and practice assessment and the U.K. study tour, to examining commu-
nity engagement strategies, developing the stop form and operational protocols, train-
ing, supervision, and data analysis. 
1.  Assessing Police Policy and Practices
STEPSS began with a policy audit,65 to review existing law, policy, and practice. Existing 
policies and training practices regarding the use of police powers to stop and search 
were examined in each setting. The assessment identified policies and practices likely 
to produce disproportionate impacts on ethnic minority and immigrant communities. 
It also reviewed previously-collected data on identity checks, stops and searches, and 
arrests; data recording practices; and how data were used to inform operations.66 The 
assessment provided basic information necessary to develop the stop form, operational 
guidelines, and a training package for the STEPSS pilot program.
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It was important to conduct the assessment at each pilot site; even when law and 
policy is national in scope, local policing units often develop their own policies and 
practices that will affect the implementation of any initiative. For example, police in 
Szeged, Hungary, had a well developed system of recording stops and using the data to 
determine performance. This facilitated STEPSS implementation as shown in the high 
compliance rate at this pilot site.  
2.  Learning from Experience: Understanding, 
  Commitment, and “Buy-in”
 
STEPSS required police to change their practices and rethink how to use stops, and to 
consider the impacts of stops on different communities. For the process to function 
effectively, it is important that both the police and the community understand the nature 
of the problem, and accept that there are alternative approaches which offer important 
benefits as well as challenges. 
Each STEPSS partner country had a different impetus for participating. The Hun-
garian police were still recoiling from the criticism and public mistrust that resulted 
from their heavy-handed management of demonstrations during the 2007 political 
crisis in Budapest. As a result, the national police were open to initiatives that could 
address the collapse in public confidence. Spanish municipal police were already start-
ing to address ethnic profiling at the local level on their own initiative in response to 
increasingly diverse immigrant populations, and welcomed technical support. In both 
the Mossos d’Equadra and the Bulgarian National Police, senior officers recognized the 
potential for discriminatory policing and viewed data gathering to monitor the impact 
and effectiveness of stops as part of a broader commitment to modern approaches and 
community policing. 
STEPSS was fortunate in having resources to invite police and community mem-
bers from pilot sites to visit the U.K. at the start of the initiative, to see how the British 
police and communities have developed their approach to address disproportionate stop 
and search practices. An introductory conference in London was followed by visits to the 
London Metropolitan Police Service and the Leicestershire Constabulary. These visits 
provided direct exposure to systems to record and supervise the use of stops, and com-
munity engagement models. Participants also took part in “ride-alongs” during which 
they witnessed stops in person. The Metropolitan Police Service also offered a “key 
encounter” training session, where a diverse group of community members and police 
officers were led through a structured discussion featuring community members reflect-
ing on the experience of being stopped and their perceptions of the police. The U.K. 
police also spoke candidly about the challenges of conducting stops and searches.
The study tour was a costly activity that will not always be an option for those inter-
ested in addressing ethnic profiling. But it is worth noting that in addition to the “full 
immersion” learning provided, the week-long experience forged valuable relationships 
among members of the country teams, many of whom—police officers and minority 
community representatives—had little prior knowledge of each others’ worlds. After 
they returned home, the police participants proved enthusiastic ambassadors for the 
project. One officer in Hungary complained, “After the captain got back from the study 
tour all we heard about for weeks was ‘this is how they do it in the U.K.’”
British officers provided additional technical assistance following the study tour 
through visits to each of the project countries. On these visits, the small group of two 
or three officers would describe their experiences and discuss them with their local col-
leagues. These visits were scheduled during the final phases of development of the stop 
form and operational guidance in order to provide a peer review process for the local 
team. The British officers visited each pilot site and discussed their experiences with 
local police and community members.
STEPSS would not have been possible without the firm commitment to the proj-
ect by the police leadership in each force. But it also became clear that project goals must 
be understood and accepted by police officers at all levels—most critically, by mid-level 
local commanders and line supervisors. The problems that arise when such under-
standing is absent were clearest in Bulgaria. Senior officers from central headquarters 
took part in the study tour rather than pilot site commanders (as was the case with the 
Spanish and Hungarian participants) and, despite their commitment, there was inad-
equate “trickle-down” to the pilot sites. During the evaluation, it became clear that police 
managers at the Bulgarian pilot sites had only a general familiarity with project goals, 
and could not articulate them fluently. None of the local police saw STEPSS as a means 
to improve community–police relations, and few perceived it as a means to strengthen 
supervision of patrol officers. There was a clear lack of local ownership rather, STEPSS 
was viewed as an imposition; a factor that directly contributed to non-compliance and 
lack of results in Bulgaria. 
Project buy-in also presented problems for the Mossos d’Equadra in Girona. At the 
time of implementation, the Mossos d’Esquadra was expanding its role in Catalunya, 
including opening new police stations and taking over some responsibilities previously 
held by the Spanish National Police. Many Mossos officers were new and relatively 
inexperienced; officers were frequently reassigned from one station to another; and 
command structures were also changing. This meant that a number of senior officers 
who were supportive of the project and received the initial training were moved during 
the pilot program and that all officers were overextended. Coincidentally, STEPSS came 
on the heels of a scandal in which Mossos officers had been taped on closed circuit 
cameras severely beating an immigrant in custody. Thus, while senior commanders 
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viewed STEPSS as a means to improve relations with immigrant communities, lower-
level officers saw the project as a control mechanism that questioned their professional-
ism and implied that they were all racists. This perception compromised their buy-in, 
which was reflected in negative postings on the police intranet, and in resistance to 
using the stop form. Furthermore, officers viewed STEPSS as a temporary pilot process 
to be tolerated for six months, and then abandoned. 
Key Lessons
Understanding: Clarity about project principles, objectives, activities, poten-
tial challenges and potential benefits is essential for all participants. It is 
important that officers at all levels understand the project benefits both in 
improved relations with the local community and in providing greater opera-
tional effectiveness and management tools.
Commitment: The commitment of senior and mid-level officers is vital as they 
must both “sell” the project to their subordinates as well as implement it. 
“Buy-in”: All patrol officers as well as supervisors and managers must at a 
minimum accept (though preferably support) the project and its legitimacy, 
as they bear the burden of the increased workload.
3.  Increasing Community Participation
The primary goal of STEPSS is to improve police relations with minority communi-
ties. In this effort, the police and local residents are equal stakeholders and partners in 
the implementation process. Community participation and transparency are essential 
aspects of STEPSS—otherwise the project would simply provide police with a new man-
agement tool, without benefiting local minority residents. The STEPSS design included 
comprehensive outreach to identify local civil society groups that could serve as partners 
in the project. Project plans called for direct community involvement in the project’s 
design and execution, including developing the stop forms and operational guidance, 
drafting “know your rights” booklets, advising and delivering training, and, most criti-
cally, forming the consultation groups that would meet to review the stop data on a 
regular basis. 
STEPSS faced considerable difficulties in creating and maintaining consultative 
groups in Bulgaria, a challenge that was compounded by the lack of police commit-
ment and the project’s results. In Sofia, area residents were highly transitory and the 
community contained a number of different Roma subgroups; factors which delayed 
the selection of commonly-recognized local community leaders. In Haskovo, the initial 
community representative had to be replaced half-way through the pilot program. The 
new leader, a woman, managed to attract other community members to the consultative 
group, despite the fact that contacts with the police are typically considered a “male job.” 
Unfortunately, the participation of a male Roma community member who had good con-
nections and authority in the community proved problematic when project coordinators 
discovered that he was the local loan shark. In Plovdiv, by contrast, leadership of and 
participation in the consultation group was consistent, with good relations between the 
police and residents of the local Sheker and Arman Roma neighborhoods. 
Spanish partners developed two distinct models of community participation. In 
Fuenlabrada, a small group of people drawn from local immigrant groups and human 
rights organizations was established at the start of the process. They helped in project 
design and training, and took part in regular monthly meetings at which they reviewed 
stop data with the police. Through this group, police forged relationships with commu-
nities they had not previously contacted, with benefits beyond monitoring the stop data. 
During early meetings, members of the Chinese community reported a series of break-
ins to small businesses; they had not reported these due to lack of contact with police and 
understanding of the justice system. The police responded with visits to explain crime 
reporting processes and provide guidance on how to improve security. On another occa-
sion, the police were planning an operation in an area with a large Moroccan population; 
they first reached out through members of the consultative group to seek support for the 
operation, explaining the limited scope and intensive nature of the action. Fuenlabrada 
police leaders are planning to broaden the scope of the consultation group, creating an 
“inter-cultural forum” to discuss a range of community issues, while continuing the work 
of the STEPSS committee on a quarterly rather than monthly basis. 
In Girona, UNESCO Catalunya led community outreach by bringing a large num-
ber of groups from Girona and outlying areas to the community meetings. At the meet-
ings, police managers explained the project and took questions and comments. But the 
Girona police partners and UNESCO decided against sharing extensive data from the 
stop forms at these meetings, both because they felt the forum was not conducive to 
discussing sensitive data and because the participants clearly wanted to discuss broader 
questions. The meetings did facilitate dialogue between the police and immigrant asso-
ciations which had had little prior contact.
There are inherent tensions in attempting to produce social change through a 
short-term project. For STEPSS, the most prominent challenge was introducing new 
practices from outside or above, because achieving sustainable change requires that the 
local communities engage with and drive new practices and policies. STEPSS clearly 
demonstrated that ethnic profiling is taking place and directly affects local minority 
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populations, yet this issue was not articulated by local minority communities in the pilot 
sites. In the United Kingdom and the United States, the outcry against ethnic profiling 
has been driven by communities victimized by discriminatory policing; the STEPSS 
project relied on police forces that were willing—for a variety of reasons—to address 
the issue proactively. 
The lack of “bottom-up” pressure for change should not be understood to mean 
that profiling is not a concern to these communities. New immigrant communities in 
Spain, and disenfranchised Roma communities in Bulgaria and Hungary, are keenly 
aware of police profiling, but they are also fighting for equal access to employment, 
housing, and education—bread and butter issues that have taken precedence to date. 
An additional factor that bears on this equation is the culture of policing that prevails 
in each STEPSS country. To varying degrees, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain are char-
acterized by state-centered, command-driven policing traditions, with little history of 
police-community dialogue. In the case of Spain’s immigrant communities, residents 
also bring expectations of policing derived from sometimes abusive policing practices 
in their countries of origin.
Key Lessons
Equal partnership: Police and residents were joint stakeholders in the STEPSS 
effort to increase the effectiveness and accountability of police stops. The 
community must be equal partners in these processes. 
Transparency: Without community participation and transparency in each 
step of the process, the project potentially provides police with a manage-
ment tool which does not necessarily benefit minority communities. 
Organize from the start: Local immigrant and minority communities must 
be engaged from the very beginning of the process and included in all key 
aspects. 
Representation: Individual community representatives cannot be expected to 
speak for whole communities. Efforts should be made to draw participants 
from as many different backgrounds as possible, including different sexes, 
ages, ethnic and religious groups, local interest groups, or neighborhood 
associations.
Dialogue and accountability: Data must be shared with the community groups 
to maintain interest and participation and ensure genuine accountability
Responsiveness: The police must respond to people’s concerns and issues 
raised during dialogue.
Community engagement takes time and energy. Yet this is an essential aspect of 
initiatives to address ethnic profiling. Community input can assist police in reading and 
understanding the meaning of their data, and the trust that is built can provide direct 
results in terms of cooperation in identifying and resolving local safety issues. A next 
step in community engagement would be to undertake qualitative monitoring whereby 
the community consultation group works with the police to review the treatment of 
people during stops.
C I V I L I A N  M O N I T O R I N G  I N  H U N G A R Y
Responding to the crisis of public confidence in the Hungarian police, the project 
opted for a system of civilian monitoring of stops as the appropriate form of com-
munity engagement. In each pilot site, a team of representatives from the local 
Roma community observed two shifts a week, and discussed their observations 
with police supervisors. Community members attended the U.K. study tour, par-
ticipated in the same training sessions and briefing sessions as the police, and 
signed confidentially agreements. Police officers were given additional guidelines 
on safety when on patrol with civilian monitors. The monitors observed all aspects 
of daily policing, focusing primarily on stops. They had the right to interact with 
the person being stopped and record any observations on the STEPSS form. They 
observed the reason for stops, who was being stopped, the conduct of the stop, 
and ensured that stops were being recorded. 
Prior to STEPSS, many Hungarian officers had little contact with Roma. The civilian 
monitors have opened a door for a frank discussion with Roma community mem-
bers about patterns of offending, cultural traditions, and other matters. This led to 
recognition of the need for more training; and in one pilot site, a civilian monitor 
led a series of training sessions on these issues. The learning has gone both ways: 
all of the civilian monitors said they developed a new perspective on policing and 
the challenges police face. As one monitor said: 
It was good to see how the police work. The officers often asked our opinions, which I appreci-
ated, and they gave me lots of information about the law. I felt like it was a good exchange. It 
was very good that we got to know each other and were actually having a relationship. I cannot 
say anything bad about the practices as all I saw was wholly positive. I had preconceptions about 
the police at the beginning and they were changed by the project—I enjoyed spending time with 
them, it was a pleasure to be involved. 
Maybe most remarkably, one civilian monitor has joined the police; he will 
be the first Roma police officer in that district. He began officer training in 
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September 2008 and runs specific training courses for his colleagues on 
Roma history and culture.
Officers have gained greater understanding of the experience of being 
stopped. In the words of one officer: 
I learned a lot from the Roma observer and they learned a lot about police work and the chal-
lenges that we face. I also understand, as [one community representative] said that when he is 
in the underground he gets stopped, but if there are five officers, he gets stopped five times, once 
by every officer, just because he is a Roma. Anyone would be unhappy with that. 
Senior officers spoke positively about unexpected benefits of external oversight. In 
one case, criminal charges were brought against a police officer for excessive use 
of force; the civilian monitor was summoned as a witness, and testified that it was 
a false complaint.
The process also faced challenges. Initially, many police officers voiced safety con-
cerns about the presence of civilians in their vehicles, and reluctance to have a 
civilian observer with them. In one pilot site, the monitors were often kept waiting 
for several hours before officers would take them on patrol, and when they did go 
on patrol, officers would not conduct stops, so there was nothing to observe. This 
happened on ten of the first sixteen shifts. The problem was corrected after an offi-
cial complaint to the area commander. Generally, the quality of stops was improved 
by the presence of monitors. It is clear that officers adapted their behavior to some 
extent in the presence of monitors, and found ways to evade scrutiny. We know of 
at least one occasion when an officer stopped but did not ticket a Roma man, but 
sought out the same man the following day with no observer present, and gave 
him a fine. 
“ K N O W  Y O U R  R I G H T S ”  B O O K L E T S  A N D 
C O M M U N I T Y  O U T R E A C H
Citizens must know their rights if officers are to be held accountable for their con-
duct. This is particularly important when introducing stop forms as the residents 
need to be aware that a form should be completed and that they will receive a copy. 
Particularly in communities with language differences and mistrust of police, resi-
dents need to understand that the form is not a fine or summons. In communities 
where low literacy is an issue, local radio and other media should be explored as a 
complementary means of notifying residents of the initiative and of their rights. 
STEPSS community consultation groups supported the design of “Know Your 
Rights” leaflets for distribution in pilot areas, and to be handed out by police to the 
people they stop. The leaflet should be kept simple and translated into languages 
commonly used by local residents. 
Bulgaria illustrates some of the issues that can arise with limited information about 
project actions and objectives. Only 500 leaflets were printed for pilot sites with a 
total Roma population of over 20,000; few complementary information campaigns 
came to fruition. Police officers reported that people, and particularly ethnic minori-
ties, responded to the stop forms with confusion or fear, with questions such as 
“What should I do with this thing now?” apparently reflecting the belief that the form 
was court summons or fine. This problem was exacerbated by patrol officers who 
were unable to explain the form and its purpose, or refused to write their name or 
sign the form. The experience was not uniformly negative; some officers also met 
with positive responses and interest in the officer’s explanation of the stop form.
4.  Developing the Stop Form and Operational 
  Guidance
The basic tool for gathering data was a stop form for officers to complete every time they 
stopped someone. Each project teams adopted its own approach to the development of 
the stop form and accompanying guidance. In Girona, Spain, a working group made up 
of the project coordinator, police, participants from the police training college, Centro 
UNESCO, and community members met monthly to discuss developments and assign 
tasks. In Fuenlabrada, Spain, the police developed the recording mechanisms and then 
reviewed it with project partners and community members through the consultation 
group. Similar approaches were taken in Hungary and Bulgaria, where they faced com-
plaints from the community members and NGOs about inadequate engagement in the 
initial design stage.
The four basic purposes of a stop form are to: (1) detect any disproportionality in 
stops of minority citizens; (2) chart how stops are being used by officers (reasons for 
stops, suspicion, location, and outcomes); (3) provide a tool for enhanced police supervi-
sion; and (4) provide a tool for monitoring of police stops by the community.
The stop forms were loosely based on the British form, but adapted to local con-
texts. In general the forms collected the following information:
• Personal data of the person stopped (name, age, social security number, 
address) 
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• Ethnicity and/or nationality 
• Name of the officer conducting the stop
• Time, date, and place of stop
• Legal grounds for the stop
• Open field to record grounds for suspicion
• Outcome (no action, fine, arrest, warning, etc.)
• Additional space to describe more specific situations (e.g., stops of several persons 
or an incident, descriptions of clothing, other information that might be useful 
for intelligence purposes). 
The stop forms differed considerably in design and complexity. Hungary had the 
simplest form and Bulgaria the longest. The Bulgarian stop form proved excessively 
complex, and much of the additional information collected was redundant.67 Both the 
Bulgarian and Hungarian police were also still legally required to complete existing 
forms as well as the STEPSS form during the pilot program. In response, the Hungarian 
project teams devised a very simple form to minimize the additional paperwork; data 
collection was also limited to comply with Hungary’s very strict personal data protec-
tion laws. 
In every case, project teams consulted with national data protection offices to be 
sure that the stop forms did not violate national and European standards. 
In Bulgaria and Spain, once officers completed the stop form they were required 
to give a copy to the person stopped. Research shows that the two biggest sources of 
dissatisfaction among those stopped are not being given a reason for the stop, and the 
conduct of officers during the stop.68 Requiring officers to give a copy of the form to 
each person they stop means the officer must articulate the reason for the stop. Because 
the copy of the stop form includes information on citizens’ rights and how to complain 
if they are dissatisfied with the treatment, this also leads the officers to focus on their 
treatment of the person during the stop.69 
The clear definition of terms is essential to creating an effective stop form. Data on 
ethnicity are at the heart of the stop form, and must be recorded in order to capture any 
disproportionality. Given past abuses of ethnic data and ongoing sensitivities, the ques-
tion of how to define and record ethnicity must be addressed with sensitivity. The U.K. 
stop form features 16 “ethnic” categories, as well as “other,” and the person stopped is 
asked to self-identify according to these categories. The officer can also provide his/her 
perception of the person’s ethnicity if they disagree with the self identification. 
Bulgaria used the U.K. dual system; while officers’ reported some discomfort with 
asking people to identify their ethnicity, the lack of reliable data in Bulgaria precludes 
further assessment of what issues arose with this approach. The Hungarian team used 
officer perception only and established very simple ethnic categories to avoid confusion 
and enhance data accuracy. In practice, this worked well.
Spain provides useful insights into the challenges of ethnic identification on 
stop forms. The Fuenlabrada team decided to use nationality as a proxy for ethnic-
ity because—with the exception of the relatively few immigrants who have acquired 
Spanish citizenship—ethnic minorities are non-nationals. The only group not captured 
in this categorization is Gitanos (Spanish Roma). The Girona team opted to use both 
nationality and officer perception of ethnic appearance. Their decision reflected a desire 
to capture the officers’ perception, on the grounds that this is more revealing about 
potential prejudices that may be driving stops. The categories were developed by the 
working group and reflected local understanding of ethnic groups. Initial data analysis 
revealed a very close association between nationality and perceived ethnicity, so the final 
analysis used nationality for purposes of comparison with Fuenlabrada. 
While the use of nationality functions at this time in Spain, and will do so in 
other European countries where immigration is a recent phenomenon and/or where 
few migrants or their children have nationalized, this approach will become less effec-
tive over time. Future efforts to combat profiling will require ethnic rather than nation-
ality-based categorizations. Each community must determine the appropriate ethnic 
categories in context; but it is worth noting that ethnic categories are fluid and not 
always self-evident, and it is important to allow that they may evolve over time.70
In addition to ethnic categorization, further data collection issues arose around 
recording the reason for stops—specifically, whether to record the law under which the 
person was stopped, or the type of police operation that led to the stop. Comparing the 
experience in Fuenlabrada (which recorded the police operation) and Girona (which 
recoded the law in question, as did Bulgaria), it appears that information on the type 
of police operation provides a far more useful analytical tool for police management 
purposes, because the police can change operational practices, but not the law. 
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Key Lessons
Keep it simple: Because the introduction of stop forms will increase officers’ 
workload, it is important to find a way to minimize the burden.
Provide clear operational guidelines: Assist officers in understanding and artic-
ulating grounds for stops, without providing ready-made answers for open 
fields on reasons for suspicion.
Be clear about what variables you want to collect on a form and why.
Use the form to give a message to those stopped: Requiring officers to give 
a person a copy of the form encourages the development of grounds for 
suspicion and enhances accountability, especially when the form includes 
information on rights and responsibilities and complaints procedures. 
Think ahead about data entry: Plan procedures and assign responsibilities for 
data entry, and test any new data systems in advance. 
Comply with data protection standards
 
Establishing a clear definition of the “hit rate” is also critical. The United King-
dom defines hits as arrests. Fuenlabrada included administrative outcomes as well as 
arrests, but only included outcomes of stops initiated by officers as hits. In Girona, 
forms included officers’ stops of people they witnessed committing a criminal or admin-
istrative offense; similar categories were used in Hungary, but a broad definition of 
offenses are captured in the “in flagrante” category under their petty offenses law. These 
differences mean that hit rates are not easily comparable across different policing dis-
tricts or countries. The hit rate is, nonetheless, an essential measure of efficiency and 
must be collected. 
The inclusion of an additional open field for recording specific grounds for suspi-
cion is a valuable tool for supervision. Officers often had difficulty articulating grounds 
for suspicion. Training made available through the STEPSS project helped officers 
address this question (training is discussed further in Section 5, below). 
5.  Training71
STEPSS required police officers to adopt new practices representing a new philosophy 
in local policing. Training was essential to build understanding of project objectives 
and benefits, as well as to teach officers how to complete the forms and enter the data. 
Project design called for joint training of police with community members, to support 
community representatives’ understanding of the project and ability to understand the 
data, as well as their ability to address the conduct of stops. 
The policy and practice assessments at the start of the project found that all of 
the forces had some form of diversity training. The impact of diversity training is con-
tested by experts, based on arguments that it can stigmatize particular ethnic groups 
or simply revisit rather than correct ethnic stereotypes.72 Two principles guided the 
STEPSS approach to training: first, that the community should be directly involved in 
the design and delivery of training and tailor information to specific local groups and 
issues; and second, that police training works best when it is directly related to legal 
standards and practical aspects of policing. STEPSS project guidance recommended the 
following elements:
• Introduction to the project’s origins and objectives, the concept of ethnic profiling, 
and practices that generate disproportionality in stops (noting that profiling may 
be either individual and/or structural/institutional). 
• Practical guidance on the law and how to complete a stop form.
• Guidance on the conduct of a stop and interactive training with community mem-
bers on the experience of being stopped. 
• Provision by community members of basic information about local issues. 
• Practical guidance on grounds of suspicion that do not rely on ethnicity, and how 
to make more effective stops.  
The Hungarian training closely followed this pattern. The guidance on suspicion 
was developed and delivered by a “cop’s cop,” an experienced and well-respected officer 
who was able to drive the issue home without alienating patrol officers. This enhanced 
officer buy-in. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee project coordinator also attended 
many of the patrol officers’ daily briefing sessions at police stations in pilot areas. In 
project evaluation interviews, all officers demonstrated a clear understanding of the 
project’s logic and objectives.
The training in Bulgaria consisted of two modules only: (1) a one-day training on 
the stop forms and data software system for two senior officers from each department; 
and (2) a two-hour lecture on project objectives, stop forms, and operational guidance 
attended by a third of the patrol officers in each pilot site. Community representatives 
attended the lectures, but not the training on the database software system, nor were 
they included in the design or delivery of training. Training did not address the con-
duct of stops, nor did daily briefings for patrol officers provide any refresher training. 
In Sofia, where there was a high turnover of officers, newly recruited staff were not 
informed about STEPSS nor taught how to use the forms. These limitations contrib-
uted to failure to gather adequate data, and other problems discussed elsewhere in this 
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report. Most regrettable was the lost opportunity to work with the community to develop 
a greater understanding of the impact of ID checks on those stopped and learn more 
about the culture, experiences, and needs of their local communities.
The two Spanish pilot sites had contrasting models of training. In both areas, all 
project partners cooperated closely in developing and delivering the training, which 
was fairly similar in content. However, police officers’ reactions were quite different. 
In Fuenlabrada, the entire corps attended and were generally receptive to and positive 
about the training, which provided: (1) an introduction to the project and the British 
experience; (2) a definition of stops and searches and a review of relevant law; (3) a 
participatory exercise to sensitize officers to discrimination; (4) a lecture from Amnesty 
International and SOS Racismo; and (5) a review of the STEPSS protocols and forms. 
The positive reaction of officers in Fuenlabrada is likely due to factors including 
the relative youth of the Fuenlabrada municipal police, their pride in being innovators, 
and their confidence in their managers. It is also noteworthy that the training presented 
STEPSS as an initiative to improve policing services and efficiency. The police leader-
ship also made it clear that they had made a commitment beyond the project itself and 
planned to implement STEPSS as a permanent policy. 
In Girona, both police managers and patrol officers attended the training. The 
course covered: (1) introduction to STEPSS; (2) community relations; (3) improving 
the quality of police-citizen encounters; and (4) the law on stop powers and the stop 
form. Despite the strong commitment at the leadership level, there was considerable 
resistance to the training and STEPSS project in the municipal police and, most mark-
edly, in the Mossos d’Esquadra. While much of the resistance reflected external factors 
(as discussed above in Section 2), trainers also offered some specific reflections and 
suggestions for improving training. The training session opened with discussions of 
discrimination and disproportionality, which put officers on the defensive—in contrast 
to the reaction when presented with stop forms as a tool for improving police services. 
One trainer remarked that, in retrospect, it would be good to do the pilot program first 
and then, on the basis of the data demonstrating disproportionality and benefits to 
police productivity, only afterwards relate the practice to discrimination and a discus-
sion of the influence of stereotypes. Another trainer felt that it would be better not to 
have the discrimination training conducted by persons of ethnic minority origin as it 
enabled officers to view their contributions as personal testimonial and not see the 
minority trainers as serious professionals.73 Trainers agreed that officers accepted the 
general discussion of discrimination and the challenges of immigrant integration, but 
that resistance appeared when these were related to specific policing practices. Some 
suggested separating the two aspects, having policing practices and practical guidance 
on the stop form presented on one day and discrimination on another.
Key lessons
Joint teaching and learning: Both police and community members need train-
ing, and both have important perspectives to impart. At least some joint 
training should be conducted to establish a clear message about values, 
objectives, and procedures.
Training content: Trainings must cover (1) using stop powers: operational 
guidance on developing suspicion for stops based on intelligence rather 
than ethnic stereotyping, improving the quality of encounters, and complet-
ing the stop form, and (2) basic information about the different ethnic and 
religious communities within a local area, their needs and priorities, and the 
experience of being stopped. 
Delivery: Specific aspects of training are best delivered by those with the 
most credibility for their audience, such as a well-respected police officer.
Interactive training techniques: Training packages should be practical, interac-
tive, and include all participants in discussions, scenarios, and role playing. 
Training must be on-going – and repeated for those that miss it or in briefing 
sessions. 
6.  Supervision
The oversight and direction that patrol officers receive from their line supervisors and 
managers are critical to the quality of their work, both in terms of accountability and 
effectiveness. The STEPSS project provided a memorandum on different approaches to 
obtaining officer compliance with the requirement that they complete stop forms,74 and 
country partners adopted different elements in each setting. 
Fuenlabrada achieved excellent officer compliance with STEPSS protocols, and 
went further, using the data as a management tool more broadly (see following box). 
Sequentially numbered forms allowed every stop to be traced to an individual officer; 
supervisors could easily observe when forms were not submitted or submitted out of 
sequence. Police managers also checked the numbers of stop forms against radio logs 
(officers are required to call in during stops). Forms with missing or problematic infor-
mation were returned to the officer to complete in full, and only when the supervisor 
signed off on the form was it entered into the database. 
A D D R E S S I N G  E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  B Y  P O L I C E     6 9
7 0     T H E  S T E P S S  P R O C E S S
Supervisors from both the municipal police and the Mossos d’Esquadra also 
checked the forms from each shift and required officers to complete information as 
required; they too cross checked numbers against radio logs. Delays in data analysis, 
discussed in the next section, precluded further use of the stop data for management 
purposes in Girona. 
In Bulgaria, lack of commitment and understanding were seen in the failure 
to develop any local guidance on compliance. Supervisors failed to notice that their 
officers were not filling out the stop forms until the end of the project. Here also the 
problem was exacerbated by delays in development of the database and data entry. 
Supervisors never saw the data as a relevant or beneficial tool of either supervision 
or management.
S T O P  D A T A  A S  A  M A N A G E M E N T  T O O L 
I N  F U E N L A B R A D A
In Fuenlabrada, the stop data were used to strengthen police supervision and 
management. Officers initially had problems completing the open field for suspi-
cion, and guidelines were produced that included a list of reasons for stops and 
examples of what grounds would be acceptable within each category. This provided 
guidance, while still requiring the officer to articulate a reason for his/her suspi-
cions in each case.
Most importantly, the sergeant in charge of STEPSS analyzed the data monthly, and 
the data on the type of stop and “motivation” allowed senior officers to supervise 
individual officers’ use of stops more closely. For example, they were concerned 
with stops in the categories of “other” or “attitude or suspicious behavior” as these 
are areas in which officers have most discretion to act on stereotypes or negative 
generalizations. Supervisors first ensured that officers understood the different 
categories and the type of stops that fell into each; this resulted in a reduction of 
officers recording “other” on the forms. The free field for recording “motivation” 
then allowed senior officers to monitor the reasons given for stops under “attitude 
and suspicious behavior” category to ensure they were satisfied that the threshold 
of “motivation” had been met.
More broadly, senior officers could assess the use of stops across the force and 
use data from the forms to guide personnel deployment. Although most crimes 
and anti-social behavior take place on the weekend, the forms showed that most 
stops were being made on Wednesdays. Officers (like everyone else) like to have 
the weekends off and had managed their schedules to work more on weekdays. 
Similarly, when managers plotted stops by time of day for October, they found 
peaks and troughs in the numbers of stops through each day, including points in 
the day when few or no stops were conducted at all—showing that officers were 
all taking their breaks at the same times. Managers restructured break times to 
make sure that officers were available at all times. Data from subsequent months 
showed more even stop patterns.
In Hungary, all the supervisors checked stop forms at the end of each shift. Super-
visors also reported that they conducted periodic spot checks, visiting officers on patrol 
or accompanying patrols not only to see that forms were filled out, but also to assess 
the conduct of stops. At the close of the data gathering, it became clear that only 68 
percent of stops had been recorded. This speaks to the ingenuity of officers and their 
ability to evade scrutiny. It also indicates the need to examine supervisory approaches 
and develop more effective techniques. None of the officers interviewed for the evalu-
ation reported being “spot checked” so we do not know how well this worked. Despite 
these weaknesses, Hungarian police supervisors found the exercise to be useful. In the 
words of a police Captain from Kaposvár: 
  “We might continue this, because before we didn’t know how to supervise the conduct of 
stops. It has highlighted all sorts of information that we didn’t know before. Supervision 
definitely needs to be emphasized more within the Hungarian police force as traditionally 
stops have been used by officers to show that they were doing something during their shifts. 
The idea was that the more you do, the harder you are working. We need to change this 
mindset.” 
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Key Lessons
Supervision is crucial to achieving compliance with recording stops, improv-
ing officers targeting of stops and effectiveness, and enhancing the quality 
of stops. Police supervisors should routinely review the reasons officers give 
for carrying out stops, identity checks and searches. Strategies for supervi-
sion include of review of individual stops and analysis of aggregate patterns 
of officers’ stops.
Provide specific training to all police managers and supervising officers on the 
use of stop forms for supervision and management.
Use a variety of supervision techniques such as a mandatory review of stop 
forms at the end of every shift, comparing numbers of forms submitted 
with radio calls logging stops, and direct observation of patrol officers and 
their conduct
Data supports supervision when it is available on a regular basis and can 
be compared to operational dynamics and personnel assignments for the 
period.
7.  Data Analysis
Data analysis proved a project weak point. STEPSS contracted criminologists and statis-
ticians in each country to analyze the data. However, for a number of reasons, including 
slow data entry and other logistical factors, the analysts only fully processed the data 
at the end of the project period. Furthermore, once analyzed, the data had to be exten-
sively revised, corrected and concepts such as odds ratios introduced. This revealed both 
the challenge of analyzing stop data, and the failure of the approach taken by STEPSS 
project management in guiding partners on key elements of stop data analysis.75 The 
chart below on the facing page sets out the basic indicators that should be measured 
and analyzed through data collection. It highlights the information that each variable 
will provide—both in terms of proportionality and fairness, and as a police management 
tool for increasing overall effectiveness. 
In Fuenlabrada, the sargeant in charge of STEPSS was adept with accounting 
software and undertook his own independent data analysis. The Fuenlabrada Municipal 
Police had monthly data in easy to understand formats that they shared with the com-
munity, and used in supervision and management. As prior discussions have made 
clear, regular data analysis is key to reaping the benefits of gathering stop data. Proper 
data analysis helps identify causes of disproportionality and reduce it, and also improves 
police supervision and management. 
Key Lessons
Stop data should be analyzed on a frequent and regular basis in order to match 
trends in stops with specific security issues and operational directives. Addi-
tional training may be required for police managers and community repre-
sentatives on how to read the stop data produced, what questions to ask 
and how to respond to operational issues that arise. 
Stop data analysis is not easy, particularly when concepts of profiling and dis-
proportionality are first introduced. Once a conceptual grasp is established, 
data analysis can be done in-house by police staff. 
Timely data input and monthly analysis are essential to extract maximum ben-
efit from the data as a supervisory and management tool.
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Table 7:







Data as police 
management tool
Number of stops by 
nationality, ethnic 
group, age, and 
gender compared to 




stops of immigrants/ 
ethnic minorities, 
both force-wide and 
by individual officers, 




stops and the 
percentage of stops 
of immigrants/ 
ethnic minorities, 
and whether this 
is disproportionate 
compared to their 
proportion of the 
local population. 
Provides basic 
information on the 
work of individual 
officers, units, shifts, 
or zones, and patterns 
for the entire police 
force. Gives the 
number of stops each 
officer is making, and 
allows supervisors to 
determine if individual 
officers or units are 
disproportionately 
targeting certain 
ethnic or religious 
groups. 
Number of stops 
leading to searches 
by nationality, ethnic 
group, age, and 
gender compared to 




in searches of 
immigrants/ ethnic 
minorities.
Data analysis will 
look at the overall 
numbers of stops 
that lead to searches 
and determine 
whether this is 
disproportionate 
when compared 
to the percentage 
of immigrants or 







total numbers of 
searches for each 
officer or unit; 
allows supervisors 
to determine if 
officers or units are 
disproportionately 
targeting certain 
ethnic or religious 
groups for searches 
after stops.
Trend analysis of 
number of stops and 
searches over time 
by nationality, ethnic 
group, age, and 
gender.
Identify 




there is a valid 
operational reason 
for targeting certain 
groups at certain 
times in relation 
to reported crime 
trends.
When compared to 
reported crime rates 
and other factors, 
data can show factors 
driving the use of 
stops. This data can 
be cross-referenced 
with the rates of 
effectiveness to 
give an insight into 
strategic decision-








Data as police 
management tool
Reason for the stop 
by nationality, ethnic 
group, age, and 
gender.
Identify reasons 




and targeting of 




to determine if 
they meet legal 
standards.
Data analysis will 
show if specific 
ethnic groups are 
being targeted for 
specific crimes. 
Cross-reference 
reasons for stops 
with the positive 
results and see 
whether officers 
are basing their 




about how officers are 
targeting stops, how 
many stops are as part 
of an operation, and 
how many are based 
on the individual 
officer’s discretion. 
Allows managers to 
check that officers 
are conducting stops 
in line with legal 
standards. Can also 
check if stops are 
being targeted at 
crimes/problems 
that are of highest 
priority to the local 
community.
Number of stops 
leading to positive 
results.
Increase the number 
of stops that 
produce positive 
results. 
Provides a trend 
analysis of changes 
in efficiency and 
supports effective 
use of stop powers. 
Provides analysis of 
the effectiveness of 
stops overall and of 
specific operations. 
Allows a comparison 
of effectiveness of 
different officers and 
units within police 
departments and 
even between similar 
police departments. 
May be used to 
support training and 
improvements in 
intelligence use, to 
increase effectiveness. 
The number of arrests 
in certain areas can 
also act as an early 
warning of potential 
officer bias.
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Data as police 
management tool
Number of positive 
stop results analyzed 















rates and where 







in the number of 
unsuccessful stops 
shows how much 
time is being wasted 
targeting ethnic 
minority groups over 
other groups. 
Relation of different 
zones within the 
police district, types of 
stops and variations in 




patterns of policing 
by zones and the 
impact they have 
on national/ethnic 
groups and their 
overall effectiveness.
Examining the 
use of stops and 
disproportionality 
by zone can identify 
whether specific 
operations have a 
disproportionate 
impact on certain 
groups, and whether 
that is justified by 
their effectiveness 
and local crime 
patterns.
Provides information 
about levels and focus 
of police deployments 
and whether they 
reflect crime patterns 
and local priorities.
VI. Conclusions
The U.K. and the United States have grappled with disproportionality in stops and 
searches over decades and continue to do so. As a fundamental first step, it is necessary 
to recognize that police use of stops and searches may have a discriminatory impact on 
ethnic minorities. Beyond this, the process of understanding and changing the factors 
that drive ethnic profiling is complex and involves culture and practice, institutions, 
and communities. 
STEPSS project partners had the foresight to recognize that they might have a 
problem with ethnic profiling and were willing to tackle the issue directly and share 
their experiences. These organizations and individuals undertook an ambitious series of 
activities over a short project timespan; they have helped to deepen our understanding 
of the dynamics of ethnic profiling and the ways in which it may be addressed. These 
achievements, and the challenges faced along the way, have produced valuable lessons 
both for the pilot sites continuing this work and for others adopting and adapting the 
STEPSS approach.
STEPSS results confirmed that ethnic profiling is not an exception to the rule, but 
is in fact the general rule. Results also show that this disproportionality is not justified 
by different offending rates, confirming similar findings in both the U.K. and United 
States. Profiling is not effective. It inconveniences large numbers of people and alienates 
entire groups within the community,76 to no demonstrable law enforcement purpose. 
Importantly, STEPSS also shows that it is possible to do something about ethnic profil-
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ing, and that monitoring stops and gathering ethnic data are important tools that not 
only address ethnic profiling, but can also be used to enhance the effectiveness of police 
use of stops, and contribute to smarter management of police operations and resources. 
Finally, STEPSS demonstrated that ethnic data gathering can be conducted in full com-
pliance with personal data protection standards. 
These results make a powerful argument for the development and use of stop 
data monitoring in any setting where there is reason to believe that ethnic profiling is 
prevalent. Where national or local police and/or elected authorities resolve to use these 
techniques, it is vital that they work in partnership with all stakeholders—that is, with 
the local community and ethnic minority groups as well as with the police. Commu-
nity input assists police in reading and understanding the meaning of their data, and 
builds trust that is shown to directly benefit policing through increasing cooperation 
in identifying and resolving local safety issues.77 Without community participation and 
transparency in each step of the process, the project potentially provides police with a 
management tool which does not address discrimination or benefit minority communi-
ties. Stop data are an accountability tool that should be gathered and shared with local 
communities to reduce ethnic profiling and enhance community safety.  
  
Annex A
Police Powers to Conduct Stops in STEPSS 
Partner Countries
STEPSS is focused on police powers to conduct stops and searches. In many cases, this 
can lead to a request or demand to search the person or the person’s vehicle. There are 
considerable differences among European countries in the legal powers of the police 
to conduct stops, identity checks and searches, as can be seen in the STEPSS project 
countries. 
Under Bulgarian law,78 all police officers have the right to carry out stops for a 
wide range of reasons including suspicion that a person has committed an illegal act, for 
the investigation of a crime, for the examination of ID documents or residence permits, 
as part of standard procedure at a police check point, and if requested by another state 
institution. Searches are permitted whenever a person has been arrested, where there is 
information that a person carries illegal or dangerous substances, or at a crime scene if 
there is information that a person has been involved in a crime. Searches of belongings 
can occur under similar circumstances or when it has not been possible to establish 
a person’s identification or the individual is illegally in the country. Police officers can 
stop a vehicle to check identification and driving licenses, if there is information that a 
crime has been committed, or to enforce the Law on Road Traffic. 
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Bulgarian legislation provides little guidance on what constitutes suspicion to 
justify the different types of stops. The only provision prohibiting discrimination in 
police work is found in the Law on the Ministry of the Interior, Instruction I-23 (second-
ary legislation adopted at the ministerial level), which requires officers to “respect the 
dignity and rights of all citizens, without discriminating according to age, gender, sexual 
orientation, race, ethnicity, political views and nationality.”79 The instruction goes on 
to provide guidelines for the conduct of stops, stating that the officer “must introduce 
her/himself with rank, family name and name of the structural unit within the police 
force and that (s)he must show her/his police card and badge upon request.”80 The 
police currently record their stops on forms that are collated and stored locally. The data 
are not released nationally. Officers call in stops on their radios if they need to check 
whether someone is wanted for an offense, but the information is only kept for a short 
period of time and is not used for statistical analysis. 
Hungarian law gives the police wide discretion to stop and search. Article 29 of 
the 1994 Police Act81 gives officers full authority to stop and ask for identification of 
“anyone whose identity needs to be established.” The failure of a person to identify 
himself or cooperate can lead to search and short-term arrest up to 12 hours until the 
person is identified.82 The Police shall be entitled to hold arrested persons in public 
security detention for up to 24 hours if the arrest was necessary for identification.83 
The act declares that identification may need to be established for purposes of public 
order or safety, crime prevention, crime detection, establishing the legality of residence, 
traffic control, or if the identity is to be established in the interest of a third party.84 
A search may be conducted if an arrest is taking place or if it is “deemed necessary” for 
the establishment of a person’s identity, if there is suspicion that a person has commit-
ted a criminal or petty offense, if it is necessary to prevent “danger,” or during raids. 
Further, Article 44 of the Police Act allows the police to stop vehicles at any time to check 
the legality of vehicle possession or operation.85 
The law does not determine a minimum level of suspicion, although Hungarian 
law includes the concept of “simple suspicion,” a concept that remains undefined, in 
effect allowing officers to search practically anyone at any time. The 2008 amendment 
to the Police Act requires officers to provide an explanation to the person stopped of the 
basis for the stop.86 The Police Act does not refer to discrimination but the Hungarian 
Constitution has a general antidiscrimination clause that refers to fundamental human 
and civil rights.87 A decision of the Constitutional Court has extended the principle of 
non-discrimination to the whole of the criminal justice system.88 Furthermore the Police 
Act contains the requirement of taking measures without any bias89 and that police shall 
respect and protect human dignity and safeguard human rights90. Officers currently 
record identity checks on forms submitted to supervisors. Officers are also required to 
call headquarters in Budapest when they stop someone to check whether the person is 
wanted. The calls are logged and can provide statistics on numbers of stops.
Spanish law requires police officers to have a “motive” to conduct a stop or search. 
Exactly what constitutes “motive” remains undefined. The Constitutional Court has ruled 
that the police have the right to search a person, “within the framework of prevention 
and investigation of criminal activity,” even if there is no indication that the person has 
committed a crime.91 The Supreme Court has ruled that stops must be carried out with 
reasonable care and within the spirit of an investigation; the police can act on simple 
suspicion but that suspicion cannot be “illogical, irrational or arbitrary.”92 The Law on 
the Security Forces and Corps states that all police officers must act in all situations 
with “absolute political neutrality and impartiality, and … without discrimination based 
on race, religion or opinion.”93 This requirement is significantly weakened by the 2001 
Constitutional Court ruling allowing ethnic profiling in the policing of immigration 
law.94 
In the United Kingdom, the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) gives 
police officers the powers to stop and search any person in public when they have rea-
sonable suspicion that the person possesses stolen goods or prohibited articles. Stop 
and search powers are embodied in a range of legislation that is collectively regulated 
by the PACE Code of Practice A. The code makes clear that reasonable suspicion cannot 
be based on personal factors alone and must have an objective basis determined by the 
circumstances of the individual case. It states:
  Reasonable suspicion can never be supported on the basis of personal factors alone without 
the supporting intelligence or information. For example, a person’s colour, age, hairstyle or 
manner of dress, or the fact that he is known to have a previous conviction for possession of 
an unlawful article, cannot be used alone or in combination with each other as the sole basis 
on which to search that person. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or 
stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more likely to be involved in 
criminal activity. A person’s religion cannot be considered as reasonable grounds for suspi-
cion and should never be considered as a reason to stop or stop and search an individual.95
In addition to clarifying the meaning of reasonable suspicion, the code makes 
provision for the recording of all stops and searches. Officers are required wherever 
practicable to provide the person who has been stopped with a record of the encounter, 
which includes the grounds for the search, the object/s that officers are looking for, the 
outcome and the name and station of the officer/s conducting the search. The record 
also contains personal details of the person searched such as name, address, ethnic 
origin, and a description, all of which the person can refuse to give. Since 1992, the 
Ministry of Justice has published annual figures on stops and searches conducted in all 
43 police forces broken down by, reason for stop, ethnicity, gender and outcome.96  
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Annex B
Hungarian Sampling Design and 
Methodological Issues
1.  Sampling Design
The very high rate of stops in Hungary resulted in a total of 22,375 stop forms being 
submitted in the three pilot sites. This created prohibitive data entry problems, and the 
project team agreed to use a proportionate, layered sample of the forms for data analysis 
purposes. But the sampling process had to overcome several problems. 
First, data from the different pilot sites were not fully consistent. In Szeged, data 
collection was stopped as of March 1, 2008, instead of March 17, 2008. In Kaposvár 
there was a two-month period in the middle of data gathering during which the officer 
collecting the forms at the end of each shift discarded forms that were not properly filled 
out. This situation was corrected after two months. A further difficulty arose because 
the envelopes in which local police sent in the forms they had gathered were not always 
accurately dated, and it was not possible in all cases to establish the exact time period 
or chronology of some stop forms. 
To address these issues, and permit trend analysis, project analysts separated the 
forms with dates from those without dates. They created a sample from the dated group 
by dividing it into three subgroups with the stop forms in a chronological sequence. 
Stop forms were selected at random and then every fifth form of this initial sample 
was selected to constitute the final sample for analysis. Despite the problem with the 
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Kaposvár data, the high rate of stops meant that the selected sample was still far larger 
(2,551) than the number required for statistical significance (300 items). 
The undated forms were also divided into three sub-groups and then every fifth 
form was selected at random. Then, the dated and undated samples were combined. 
The trend analysis used only the dated sample, whereas the aggregate analyses were 
run on the combined sample.
Table 8:
Hungary: Number of STEPSS forms and forms in the sample
Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of forms 2,015 11,255 9,105 22,375
Number of forms in sample 403 2,251 1,821 4,475
2.  Adjustments to data on rate of stops
The rate of stops in Hungary also had to be adjusted to reflect stops in which the 
STEPSS form was not filled out. The police in the pilot sites provided the total number 
of stops performed over a seven-month period (September 1, 2007–March 31, 2008) that 
included the six months of data collection (September 17, 2007–March 17, 2008). The 
total for the three areas was 43,094 stops.97
Table 9:
Hungary: Number of stops during STEPSS period
Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of checks
recorded over seven months
3,538 25,770 13,786 43,094
The analysts adjusted the data to estimate a total for six months by calculating the 
monthly average and multiplying that number by six. 
Table 10:
Hungary: Number of stops during six months of STEPSS period
Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of checks 3,033 22,089 11,817 36,939
This number is much higher than the number of STEPSS forms received from 
the police. 
Table 11:
Overall number of ID checks and completed forms within the project period














Budapest 3,033* 8 2,015** 8 66
Kaposvár 22,089* 60 13,506** 53 61
Szeged 11,817* 32 9,934** 39 84
Total 36,939* 100 25,455** 100 69
* Adjusted figure
**  Hypothetical figure
In order to establish the compliance rate, the analysts had to calculate the number 
of STEPSS forms that would have been received had data collection in Kaposvár and 
Szeged matched project protocols. For Kaposvár, analysts made an assumption that half 
of the forms were discarded by the supervisor creating a deficit on one month’s worth of 
forms. The 11,255 forms received from Kaposvár were assumed to constitute five months 
worth of forms, and the corresponding figure for the full six months was assumed 
to be 13,506 forms. For Szeged, analysts calculated the monthly average number of 
forms filled out, and added half of one month to the total to make up a full six-month’s 
worth of data. With these adjustments, the totals for actual stops and for the number of 
STEPSS stop forms completed are as follows.




The following materials are available on request from the Open Society Justice Initiative. 
Please contact: info@justiceinitiative.org. 
General
• Guidelines for conducting an assessment of existing law, policy, and operational 
guidelines
• U.K. study tour agenda 
• Stops monitoring tool providing guidance on basic components of gathering and 
analyzing stop data
• Compliance mechanism memo
 
Bulgaria
• Stop form (English and Bulgarian)
• Know Your Rights leaflet (English and Bulgarian)
• Operational guidance 
• Stops database/data entry user manual (English and Bulgarian)
• National STEPSS report
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Hungary
• Stop form (English or Hungarian)
• Know Your Rights booklet 
• Operational guidance (English or Hungarian)
• Training syllabus
• National STEPSS report
 
Spain
• Stop forms from Fuenlabrada and Girona (English or Spanish)
• Know Your Rights booklets (English or Spanish)
• Operational guidance (English or Spanish)
• Training syllabus (English or Spanish)
• Short video about the STEPSS project and ethnic profiling in Fuenlabrada.
Annex D
Ethnic Profiling in Europe: An Overview of the 
Justice Initiative Project
In 2005, the Open Society Justice Initiative, which works around the globe to foster 
rights-based law reform, launched an effort to address ethnic profiling by police in 
Europe. The Justice Initiative was concerned on the one hand by long-standing allega-
tions of police discrimination against Roma and other visible minorities in the course of 
ordinary crime prevention activities, and on the other by new reports about law enforce-
ment targeting Muslims in the fight against terrorism. Working closely with local part-
ners in various European countries, the Justice Initiative aims to address the current 
gaps in understanding, documenting, and addressing this problem by pursuing the 
following goals: 
1. Increasing awareness of the issue, in part through research and documentation, 
among law enforcement officers, human rights advocates, policymakers, and the 
public;
2. Advocating for the adoption of a clear European norm and national legislation that 
explicitly ban ethnic profiling in all contexts, including counter-terrorism; and
3. Developing the capacity of civil society and police to work together in creating and 
applying good practices to monitor and remedy discriminatory patterns. 
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The following publications are available from the Justice Initiative at www.Justice
initiative.org or by emailing a request to info@justiceinitiative.org: 
• Justice Initiatives: Ethnic Profiling in Europe, June 2005, 99 pages.
• Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro, June 2006, 67 pages.
• “I Can Stop and Search Whoever I Want”: Police Stops of Ethnic Minorities in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain, April 2006, 106 pages.
• Ethnic Profiling in the European Union (working title; publication scheduled for 
2009).
• Ethnic Profiling on the Paris Metro (working title; publication scheduled for 2009). 
Adoption of a clear European norm and national legislation
The Justice Initiative has fostered collaborative relationships with regional networks 
and NGOs, to raise awareness in European and international institutions of the issue of 
ethnic profiling and the problems associated with this practice. The issue is beginning 
to gain recognition, the first step towards establishing a clear European norm. Indica-
tors of progress include:
• The final opinion of the EU network of independent experts on human rights 
addresses ethnic profiling in detail, concluding that “differential treatment on 
[grounds of ethnicity] should in principle be considered unlawful under any cir-
cumstances.”
• In May 2007, Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Thomas Ham-
marberg issued a viewpoint on ethnic profiling which cited the Justice Initiative’s 
work and criticized the use of profiling in counter- terrorism.
• The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, the Council 
of Europe’s anti-racism watchdog) issued General Policy Recommendation No. 11 
on police discrimination, which defines and addresses ethnic profiling. 
• The European Parliament’s Civil Liberties (LIBE) committee is preparing a self-ini-
tiated parliamentary report on ethnic profiling in counter-terrorism, law enforce-
ment, immigration, customs, and border control.
 
The development of civil society and police capacity to address profiling
The STEPSS project has been the most important undertaking to date in our efforts to 
identify and implement strategies to address ethnic profiling and improve police-minor-
ity relations. In addition, the Justice Initiative is currently partnering with the Univer-
sity of Warwick, United Kingdom, to research and draft “Combating Ethnic Profiling; 
A Handbook of Good Practice” for the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA). The handbook will be published by the FRA in 2009. It contains examples of 
good practice from many EU member states, and elaborates a conceptual model of good 
practice areas.
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stops and searches to a specific time and place but does not require police to have any basis of 
reasonable suspicion.
33 Ibid.
34 M. FitzGerald, Searches in London, under s1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, (London: 
Metropolitan Police Service, 1999).
35 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System–2006/7, at pp. 24, 32. 
36 Studies have questioned the quality of information entered on stop forms. A study in London 
found that officers repeatedly used uniform and standard phases to describe events, thereby 
undermining the requirement that suspicion be individualized. Almost all the forms had been 
initialled by a supervisor, thus supervisors were accepting search records presenting inadequate 
grounds of suspicion for stops and searches. Nacro, the crime prevention charity, Policing Local 
Communities - The Tottenham Experiment, (London: NACRO, 1997).
37 Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, The New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop and Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York, (December 1999).
38 The total population of Fuenlabrada is 209,102 of which 15.9 percent are foreigners (Funlabrada 
municipal government, July 17, 2008). 
39 Hit rates are not calculated on the same grounds in all locations. In Fuenlabrada the “hit 
rate” includes all instances where the police discover a breach of the law (administrative and 
criminal) through their stops and/or searches. They do not include people caught in the act 
(in flagrante), though stops of persons in the act of committing offenses are included in the 
definition of positive outcomes in Girona, resulting in higher but non-comparable hit rates.
40 The “other” category in the Spanish data refers to all other nationalities combined.
41 They also included an open field to record “motivation” or actual suspicion leading to the stop. 
See discussion in this chapter on supervisors’ use of this information.
42 It should be noted that hot spot operations are often designed to have a deterrent effect at that 
particular location. Deterrence is difficult to measure and may not show up in hit rates. 
43 No arrests were made, as prostitution is not illegal in Spain. 
44 It was not possible to analyze the number of repeat stops of the same women or to confirm that 
all stops took place in the industrial zone. Such data would illustrate how targeted the operation 
was in practice.
45 The operation was carried out in conjunction with the national police, as it was considered likely 
that there would be another bombing in Madrid due to the concurrence of two events: the trial 
of the March 11th bombing suspects and the hunger strike of the notable ETA member Iñaki 
de Juana Chaos.
46 The data generated by the municipal police and Mossos D’Esquadra was not analyzed until the 
end of project. Thus the project was unable to generate monthly reports on the trends emerg-
ing from the data for either police operational purposes or to share with the community during 
consultative meetings. Given the delay in analyzing the data, we are unable to explain the trend 
and patterns that emerge in as much detail as we would like. 
47 Girona Municipal Police radio logs show that during the six months officers conducted 2170 
stops; thus officers completed STEPSS forms in 70 percent of cases. The Mossos d’Esquadra 
initially reported that, compared to radio logs, they found that officers had completed forms 
in 70 percent of their stops.  While falling short, the recording rate is high enough to support 
analysis.  Shortly before going to print, Justice Initiative received aggregate numbers of stops 
by the Mossos d’Equadra in the Girona area recorded from radio logs; this showed that STEPSS 
captured just under 20 percent of the stops conducted.  However, the aggregate number pro-
vided includes traffic stops—which were not included in STEPSS in Spain—including fixed 
check-points established on the national highway in response to terror and smuggling alerts. 
The Mossos data also include special units working in Girona that were not filling out STEPSS 
forms, and stops conducted at sporting events.  The data cannot be disagreggated, but it pro-
vides reason to believe that the compliance rate of Mossos officers in the STEPSS project may 
in fact have been significantly under 70 percent.  The data must be read as, at best, a general 
reflection of practice.  
48 Positive results include all administrative and criminal offenses, and persons detained in the 
commission of a crime or misdemeanor. This is a broader definition than that used in Fuen-
labrada, which accounts in some measure for the higher hit rate in the Girona data. 
49 Population data from the Girona municipal government, “Age data by nationality and gender” 
July 23, 2008. Girona also has a significant commuter and transient population who come 
from the surrounding area for shopping and entertainment. The analysis refers to the four 
most stopped groups in Girona and an “other” group including all other foreign groups (whose 
population numbers were too small to be statistically significant). 
50 While the hit rate for Romanians is higher, it is important to note that the number of stops and 
arrests is low and more data would be necessary to verify whether this hit rate remained high 
and could be associated with offending rates.
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51 The criteria established by each force for what counts as “directed” and “non-directed” differ 
substantially.
52 Stops in Hungary are not limited to discretionary stops on the street of those suspected of 
committing a crime, but also include identity checks of people who witness or report crimes. 
Stop numbers have been adjusted to remove the ID checks that are performed on people who 
report or witness crimes. The police provided the estimated proportions of these ID checks at 
10 percent in Kaposvár, 20 percent in Szeged and 30 percent in Budapest. The total number of 
stops was calculated using records of radio logs kept by police headquarters in each area. Data 
collection methords differed across pilot sites: in some areas officers are required to call in to 
check if someone is wanted, while in other areas stops are recorded on daily activity logs.
53 The Budapest Sixth District Police Unit covers an inner-city area with one of the city’s three 
main railway stations, a large shopping area, offices, and restaurants. There is a small residen-
tial population and large commuter and transient population. The census population is 39,000 
but we use a figure of 65,000 in the analysis to reflect the large transient population, based on 
a calculation by Zsolt Akács, head of the Department for Public Order, Sixth District.
54 Population of the Greater Kaposvár Region. Source: KSH Népességtudományi Kutató Intézet, 
Elo˝reszámítási adatbázis, 2003 (http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.php?m=830&id=566).
55 Population of the Greater Szeged Region. Source: http://www.icicom.hu/teruletfo/csmhu15.
htm.
56 Under Article 33 (2) a) of the Police Act an officer may take any person who cannot provide 
conclusive identification or who refuses to cooperate with police into short-term arrest of up to 
12 hours or until their identity is verfied. 
57 Act LXIX of 1999 on Petty Offenses (Petty Offenses Act) establishes petty offenses ranging 
from “grave,” or those punishable by a 60-day prison term (e.g., prostitution or physical threats), 
to those punishable by fines (e.g., petty theft or traffic infractions). 
58 If stops related to traffic offenses are removed, the remaining stops result in one percent arrest, 
three percent short-term arrest, 19 percent petty offense procedure, and 76 percent no further 
action taken.
59 ID checks were considered “unsatisfactory” by the project team if they failed to reach a level of 
specificity needed to reconstruct the perceived suspicion on the basis of information provided 
by the office.
60 Roma ethnicity is based on the perception of the officer making the stop; Hungarian forms 
recorded officer perception of ethnicity. See Chapter V, section 4 for a discussion of stop form 
design.
61 László Hablicsek, Márta Gyenei, István Kemény, Kísérleti számítások a roma lakosság területi 
jellemzo˝inek alakulására és 2021-ig történo˝ elo˝rebecslésére, p. 63. See: http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.
php?p=605&m=1003.
62 István Kemény: A magyarországi cigány népesség demográfiája: http://www.demografia.hu/
Demografia/2004_3-4/Kemenypercent20Istvan_kozl.pdf.
63 Disproportionality ratios are calculated on the basis of estimated Roma populations. The 2008 
Roma population of Budapest is estimated at around 75,000 or 4.4 percent of the total popula-
tion of 1.7 million. Due to local population concentration, Roma make up a higher percentage 
of the population of the Sixth District and its vicinity, but are not above 10 percent of the local 
population; this higher estimate is used in calculating disproportionality. The Szeged Roma 
population estimate was calculated by László Zélity, head of the Szeged Police Headquarters; 
the Kaposvár population estimate was calculated by Imré Bogdán, president of the Kaposvár 
Roma Self-government.
64 Data entry took some 15 minutes per form due to deficient training (e.g., officers were not told 
to use the TAB button on the Numeric Pad for greater speed and did not have touch typing 
skills). The evaluation team was told of some extreme cases when officers spent three to five 
hours in a single day entering stop form data.
65 Policy audits are a fairly common tool that is valuable for determining policies and practices. 
They can also get police management thinking about actual practice—what is happening at 
street level—and how it may diverge from official policy. Policy audits should use a range of 
materials beyond law, policies, statistics and qualitative information—such as media reports, 
interviews with local community members, and complaints.
66 The guidance for this assessment was prepared based on inputs from the United Kingdom’s 
Ministry of Justice and through consultation with other experts and then adapted to fit each 
local context. Further information is available in the STEPSS resource packet which can be 
obtained from the Justice Initiative by emailing a request to info@justiceinitiative.org. 
67 Prior to the project, Bulgarian police were required to complete up to five forms when they 
conducted a stop. In a compromise, the police added other details to the basic STEPSS form 
that were not specifically related to the objectives of the project, with the aim of testing whether 
one form could replace all of the other documents. This created problems during the pilot, 
because the stop form did not replace the other forms and so created added paperwork. 
68 1990 Trust, Stop and Search: The Views and Experiences of Black Communities on Complaining to 
the Police. London: Metropolitan Police Authority, 2004. S. Havis and D. Best, Stop and Search 
Complaints (2000–2001), (London: Police Complaints Authority, 2004).
69 STEPSS used paper forms, but other approaches to data collection are equally valid. The criti-
cal elements of the process are the data collected, and providing the person stopped with some 
form of receipt. In some U.S. jurisdictions, police call information in to radio dispatchers; it is 
also possible to give the person stopped a business card with information on the officer and a 
unique reference number to enable citizen complaints.
70 In the United Kingdom, for example, the categorization used for immigrants from the Carib-
bean has evolved from “colored,” through West Indian, black, Afro-Caribbean, and African-
Caribbean, to black British in the space of 50 years. The United Kingdom will review and may 
change these and other categories again at the next census to reflect population changes with 
growing European migration. There is also currently a debate around recording religion.
71 Sample operational guidance, like other STEPSS materials, are included in a STEPSS resource 
packet, available from the Justice Initiative by emailing a request to info@justiceinitiative.
org. 
72 A Harvard study on the impact of diversity training in addressing discrimination in the work-
place found that it has no effect or even adverse effects. Frank Dobbin, Alexandra Kalev, and 
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Erin Kelly, “Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative 
Action and Diversity Policies,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, August 2006, 
589–617. 
73 The community trainers were of immigrant origin, but all worked with various local and 
regional NGOs, including Centro UNESCO and were experienced trainers.
74 Sample forms are included in the STEPSS resource packet, available from the Justice Initiative 
by emailing a request to info@justiceinitiative.org.
75 The Justice Initiative STEPSS project managers distributed extensive materials from the Brit-
ish police, including introductions to and discussions of data analysis. These materials were 
reviewed at a data analysis meeting held in February 2007 in Budapest. In retrospect, it appears 
that the novelty of the analysis for partners in the pilot country settings would have been bet-
ter served by preparing a special introduction and step-by-step guidance. Justice Initiative has 
prepared a “stops monitoring tool” providing a basic introduction to stop data analysis which 
is available in the STEPSS resource packet. 
76 U.K. and U.S. research shows that unsatisfactory police-public contact has a negative impact 
on public confidence in police, not only for the individual directly involved, but also for their 
family, friends and associates. Joel Miller, Nick Bland and Paul Quinton (2000) The Impact of 
Stops and Searches on Crime and the Community Police Research Series Paper 127 London: Home 
Office; Ronald Weitzer and Steven A. Tuch “Determinants of Public Satisfaction with the Police” 
in Police Quarterly No. 8 (3) 2005: 279-297; Joel Miller, Robert C. Davis, Nicole J. Henderson, 
John Markovic and Christopher W. Ortiz (2004) Public opinions of the police: The influence of 
friends, family, and media. NIJ technical report (2001-IJ-CX-0038); Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Amie 
M. Schuck, Sandra K. Costello, Darnell F. Hawkins, and Marianne K. Ring “Attitudes toward 
the police: The effects of direct and vicarious experience” Police Quarterly No. 8 (3) 2005: 343-
365. Research also demonstrates that bad treatment by the police is associated with reduced 
cooperation with the police. McCluskey, John D., Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Roger B. Parks. 
1999. “To acquiesce or rebel: Predicting citizen compliance with police requests,” Police Quar-
terly 2:389–416. 
77 Studies in both the U.K. and U.S. show unambiguously that regular community consulta-
tion contributes directly to reducing crime and improving the public’s sense of security. David 
Weisburd and John E. Eck, “What Can Police Do to Prevent Crime, Disorder and Fear,” in The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2004, Vol. 593, No. 1, 42–65); 
David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work (New York: New Press, 
2002); Rachel Tuffin, Julia Morris, and Alexis Poole An Evaluation of the Impact of the National 
Reassurance Policing Programme (London: Home Office, 2006).
78 The legal standards governing police powers in Bulgaria are outlined in the Law on the Min-
istry of Interior (LMOI) and the Regulation on its Implementation (RILMOI): LMOI effective 
01.05.2006; promulgated SG No. 17 of February 24, 2006; amended SG No. 30 of April 11, 
2006; amended SG No. 102 of December 19, 2006. RILMOI promulgated SG No. 47 of June 
9, 2006.
79 Law of the Ministry of the Interior (LMOI), Instruction I-23, p. 24, Chapter 4, Part 1, art. 
57(1).
80 Ibid., art. 57(2).
81 Act XXXIV of 1994 on police (hereafter Police Act), amended text effective from 1st January 
2008. 
82 Article 33 (2) a) of the Police Act: In order to protect public security, the police officer may bring 
to the authority or other competent organisation any person who cannot identify him/herself in 
a conclusive manner or refuses to identify him/herself when requested to do so by the police 
officer.
83 Article 38 (1) of the Police Act.
84 Article 29 (1) of the Police Act.
85 Article 44 (b) of the Police Act. 
86 Article 20 (2) of the Police Act.
87 Article 70/A of Act XX of the 1949 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary.
88 Decision no. 61 of 1992, date of passage November 20, 1992.
89 Article 13 (2) of the Police Act.
90 Article 2 (1) of the Police Act.
91 Decision No. 32/1991 (January 28, 1991), Constitutional Court of Spain.
92 Decision No. 4005/1991 (April 15, 1993), Supreme Court of Spain.
93 Organic Law 2/1986, March 13, 1986, of the Security Forces and Bodies.
94 The Spanish Supreme Court upheld the legality of a decision by the national police to stop 
an African-American woman with Spanish citizenship solely on the grounds of her race. See 
Rosalind Williams, Spanish Constitutional Court Decision No. 13/2001, January 29, 2001 (STC 
13/2001).
95 PACE 2008: para 2.2.
96 The PACE Code of Practice was last updated on December 31, 2008. The code makes a distinc-
tion between “stop and accounts,” where people are stopped and asked to account for their 
actions, and stops that lead to searches. Police are no longer required to record information on 
“stop and accounts” other than the ethnicity of the person stopped.
97 Information from the police units participating in the project. The three concerned headquar-
ters collected the information on the total number of ID checks in different ways. The Sixth 
District collected the information from the register of database inquiries (in terms of internal 
norms, all ID checked people shall be checked in the central database for wanted persons, so 
from the number of inquiries initiated into this database, the number of checks can be cal-
culated). The other two headquarters provided the information based on the daily reports of 
officers on duty, with the database summarizing the data coming from these daily reports. 
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Every day, police in Europe make hundreds of decisions about whom 
to stop and search. The power to stop and search is a basic tool of 
policing and stops are the primary point of contact with police for most 
people, but their impact and effectiveness are rarely examined. Stops 
and searches can help detect crime, but can also entail ethnic profiling 
and damage police-community relations if members of minority groups 
are stopped disproportionately.
This book describes how selected police forces in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Spain worked with the Open Society Justice Initiative to monitor 
the use of stops, determine if they disproportionately affect minority 
groups, and assess their efficacy in detecting and solving crime. The 
ultimate goal of the Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search 
(STEPSS) project was to improve relations between police and minority 
communities by increasing the fairness, effectiveness, and accountability 
of police stops.
Addressing Ethnic Profiling by Police details the successes and short-
comings of the STEPSS project. It tracks the changes undertaken by 
participating police forces, including a municipal police force in Spain 
that increased the effectiveness of stops while reducing their number 
and disproportionality. Perhaps most important, Addressing Ethnic 
Profiling by Police provides a roadmap toward greater fairness, improved 
efficiency, and better police-community relations.
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